THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WTO
EXCEPTIONS
TIMOTHY MEYER*

ABSTRACT
In a bid to save the planet from rising temperatures, the European Union
is introducing a carbon border adjustment mechanism—essentially a levy
on imports from countries with weak climate rules. The United States,
Canada, and Japan are all openly mulling similar proposals. The Biden
Administration is adopting new Buy American rules, while countries around
the world debate new supply chain regulations to address public health
issues arising from COVID-19 and shortages in critical components like
computer chips. These public policy initiatives—addressing the central
environmental, public health, and economic issues of the day—all likely
violate World Trade Organization (WTO) rules governing international
trade, as well as regional free trade agreements. This inconsistency poses a
political problem domestically and a diplomatic problem internationally, to
say nothing of potential consequences authorized by the WTO.
To ward off these consequences, governments will seek to justify their
measures under a series of exceptions to trade obligations first drafted in
1947. Although governments have invoked these exceptions with increasing
frequency in recent years, they have never been tested in the manner that
they will be in the coming years. Indeed, a provision in the 2021
Infrastructure and Investment Act—the first major legislative piece of the
Biden Administration’s economic agenda—contains a provision directing
the government to invoke these exceptions to justify measures to
manufacture personal protective equipment (PPE) in the United States.
This Article seeks to make sense of the exceptions and their role in the
legal, political, and diplomatic proceedings that determine the fate of public
policies that restrict trade. It distills three paradigms through which to view
legal exceptions in international trade agreements. Under the Policy Space
Paradigm, governments have the right to violate international obligations
so long as the violation is necessary to pursue a public policy goal permitted
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by an exception. Under the Safety Valve Paradigm, exceptions excuse
violations that are undeterrable, such as those motivated by overwhelming
domestic political pressure. Both of these approaches, which are dominant
in international legal practice, permit governments to invoke international
legal exceptions only to the extent that the government acts with a single,
permissible objective. In so doing, both paradigms rest on faulty
assumptions about how domestic policymaking works.
I therefore introduce the Channeling Paradigm, which rests on the
observation that international trade policies are the result of bargaining
between domestic interest groups. Exceptions in trade agreements influence
that bargaining process and the resulting domestic coalitions. Industries
seeking economic protection will often ally themselves with groups pursuing
“non-trade” public policy goals, such as environmental protection or
public health. Both groups benefit. The domestic industry obtains protection
from foreign competition by lending its political support to a public policy
goal. Public policy advocates obtain important political support for policies
that provide public goods that governments often undersupply, such as
measures to protect public health, fight climate change, and address
economic inequality. Counterintuitively, then, the domestic political
bargaining that legal exceptions encourage serves the public interest by
channeling protectionist pressure into the promotion of public goods.
The Channeling Paradigm has implications for dispute resolution under
international trade agreements, as well as the drafting of new agreements.
In short, existing tests for the application of trade agreements’ public policy
exceptions unduly constrain domestic politics. This Article argues that trade
tribunals and treaty negotiations should adopt a Predominant Motive test
when interpreting and drafting exceptions clauses. Under this approach, a
trade restrictive policy would benefit from an exception if the primary
objective of the measure is a permitted goal under the exception. So long as
it does not become the predominant purpose of the challenged policy,
economic protection would not be fatal to invoking an exception. The WTO
compatibility of a wide range of critical government policies that have
mixed motives—including President Biden’s Buy American requirements
that seek to address economic inequality within the United States; efforts to
reshore critical U.S. supply chains with the goal of ensuring the United
States has access to the components it needs to be a global leader in
manufacturing; the European Union’s efforts to impose a carbon tariff in
aid of its efforts to combat climate change; and public health restrictions
on trade in medical supplies and the COVID-19 vaccine—all depend on a
more flexible approach to international legal exceptions.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2021, amidst the hottest summer on record and with wild fires
burning from California to Turkey, the European Union (EU) announced
that it would impose a carbon border adjustment—essentially a levy on
imported products from countries that lack stringent climate rules governing
production.1 The move reflects a bid by the EU to encourage countries to
adopt tougher climate rules, while also discouraging European consumers
from consuming high-carbon products. The United States, Canada, Japan,
and the United Kingdom are considering similar policies.2 Since taking
1.
Steven Erlanger & Somini Sengupta, Europe Unveils Plan to Shift from Fossil Fuels, Setting
Up
Potential
Trade
Spats,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
15,
2021),
http://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/14/world/europe/climate-change-carbon-green-new-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/HAV9-77MH].
2.
See Timothy Meyer & Todd N. Tucker, A Pragmatic Approach to Carbon Border Measures,
20 WORLD TRADE REV. 1 (2021) (cataloguing nations’ efforts to adopt carbon border measures); Rachel
Morison & Anna Edwards, UK Considers Carbon Border Tax to Protect Domestic Industry,
BLOOMBERG (May 28, 2021, 3:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-28/u-kconsiders-carbon-border-tax-to-protect-domestic-industry [https://perma.cc/276Z-2FXP].
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office in January 2020, President Joe Biden has expanded Buy American
requirements in an effort to address economic inequality within the United
States;3 directed a review of critical U.S. supply chains with the goal of
ensuring the United States has access to the components it needs to be a
global leader in manufacturing;4 and defended national security-related
curbs on trade with Hong Kong in response to the suppression of democracy
there.5 The 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act—the first major
legislative piece of the Biden Administration’s economic agenda—contains
an entire Title devoted to “Build America, Buy America.”6 The EU imposed
export restrictions on COVID-19 vaccines in early 2021,7 a measure which
follows extensive export restrictions on medical supplies during the early
stages of the pandemic.8
These measures—each of which is likely to violate international trade
rules, most notably those of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—are the
most recent in a long line of trade restrictive measures governments have
adopted that both serve a legitimate public policy objective and also benefit
a domestic economic constituency. The United States, for instance, banned
the import of shrimp caught in a manner that endangers sea turtles, a move
supported by U.S. shrimpers eager for a market advantage.9 To the delight
of domestic tire producers, Brazil banned the importation of retreaded tires
because when discarded they become breeding grounds for malarial
mosquitos.10 The EU refused to extend regulatory incentives for renewable
energy to biofuels that lead to a risk of deforestation, a move hailed by the

3.
Exec. Order No. 14,005, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,475 (Jan. 28, 2021).
4.
Exec. Order No. 14,017, 86 Fed. Reg. 11,849 (Mar. 1, 2021).
5.
Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
[hereinafter
Statements],
at
11
(Feb.
22,
2021),
https://gpa-mprodmwp.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/sites/25/2021/02/Feb22.DSB_.Stmt_.as_.deliv_.fin_.public.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q99B-JGMX].
6.
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, H.R. 3684, 117th Cong. §§ 70901, 70911 (2021)
(enacted).
7.
Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Amid Critical Shortage, E.U. Moves to Limit Vaccine Exports, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/29/world/europe/EU-AstraZeneca-vaccineexport.html [https://perma.cc/6BY4-V2TU].
8.
CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY & CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS, CONG. RES. SERV., IF1151,
EXPORT RESTRICTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2021).
9.
See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 19 Ct. Int’l Trade 1461, 1466 (1995) (quoting the
affidavit of the president of the Georgia Fisherman’s Association (GFA), which stated “if everyone in
the shrimping industry were [subject to the regulation], it would allow [GFA members] to compete
evenly with foreign shrimpers”); see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter
United States—Shrimp].
10.
See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO
Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil—Tyres].
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EU’s domestic biodiesel industry.11 Russia restricted the transit across its
territory of Ukrainian products due to the geopolitical tensions between the
two nations since the former’s invasion of Crimea, but closer examination
suggests that the specific restrictions imposed are motived by a desire to
protect domestic industries.12
In each of these cases, a country imposed a trade restriction justified by
an ostensible “non-trade” public policy goal—the environment, public
health, or national security. And each of these measures was actively
supported by a domestic interest group that stood to benefit from the
resulting economic protection. This pattern, a common occurrence, presents
an increasingly difficult challenge for the WTO and the world trading
system more generally. More and more, governments clamor for the legal
right to pursue policies that violate trade rules and burden international
commerce. Many of these policies—carbon border adjustments to fight
climate change,13 restrictions on seal products to promote animal welfare,14
domestic content requirements to spur the development of local renewable
energy industries,15 or restrictions on trade in goods made with forced
labor16—address political and moral imperatives for which leaders and their
constituents are willing to sacrifice the economic efficiency that
accompanies trade liberalization. But building domestic political coalitions
for these policies often involves using economic protection to benefit a
domestic group. Governing is, after all, the art of compromise.
This Article argues that exceptions to international trade law’s general
rules provide the incentives that lead to the formation of these domestic
coalitions. This argument is counterintuitive. International trade law is
11.
See EBB Position: Red II Delegated Act on Low & High ILUC-risk Biofuels, EUR. BIODIESEL
BD. (Feb. 2019), https://ebb-eu.org/news/ebb-position-red-ii-delegated-act-on-low-high-iluc-riskbiofuels/ [https://perma.cc/7BEC-DMJS].
12.
Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.4, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Russia—Traffic in Transit]. See also Pramila Crivelli
& Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Separating the Political from the Economic: The Russia-Traffic in Transit
Panel Report, 20 WORLD TRADE REV. 582 (2021).
13.
Inception Impact Assessment, Carbon Border Tax Adjustment Mechanism (2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12228-Carbon-BorderAdjustment-Mechanism [https://perma.cc/T4CH-2MMM].
14.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 2.107, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [hereinafter
EU—Seals].
15.
See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy
Sector, ¶ 2.5, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/R (circulated June 27, 2019); Appellate Body Report, India—
Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, ¶ 5.46, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R
(adopted Oct. 14, 2016); Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, ¶ 5.38, WTO Doc. WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 24, 2013).
16.
Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Cracks Down on Goods Produced by China’s
State-Sponsored Forced Labor (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/09/14/dhs-cracksdown-goods-produced-china-s-state-sponsored-forced-labor [https://perma.cc/LCB8-N2QE].
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commonly justified on the grounds that it restrains domestic political
pressure for protection.17 Yet trade law also operates through a normexception framework. International trade’s primary rules aim to ensure
equality of competitive opportunities for global commerce. Policies that
deviate from those rules in the name of some other policy objective require
affirmative justification. This need to affirmatively justify policies is also
an opportunity to justify economic protection. Unable to justify protection
on its own terms, interest groups benefiting from protection will lend their
political support to policies that fit within the exceptions. I refer to this
dynamic as Channeling.
Channeling has two important effects that have been overlooked. First,
the norm-exception framework harnesses protectionist pressures in the
service of other legitimate public policy objectives. A common account of
international trade law is that it operates to change domestic politics.
Because international trade rules are predicated on a reciprocal exchange of
concessions—that is, they link one state’s trade barriers to another state’s
trade barriers—the international trading system turns exporters that
otherwise might be uninterested in their own nations’ imports barriers into
lobbyists for fewer trade barriers in their own countries. Trade’s primary
rules, in other words, create countervailing domestic political forces to push
back against protectionist pressure.
Exceptions work in a similar way.18 Some degree of protectionist
pressure is inevitable in a national economy. Bruce Lee famously said: “Be
like water making its way through cracks. Do not be assertive, but adjust to
the object, and you shall find a way round or through it.”19 Protectionist
political pressure is like water. It will seek to find a way around or through
the barriers that face it. Exceptions respond to this reality by channeling
protectionist pressure into a beneficial purpose.
Protection typically benefits the protected economic interest at the
expense of the general public. But a number of public policy goals—climate
17.
See Harlan Grant Cohen, Editorial Comment, What Is International Trade Law For?, 113
AM. J. INT’L L. 326, 329–332 (2019).
18.
Following Jorge Viñuales, I use the term exceptions throughout this article “to refer to a wide
variety of techniques that provide special legal treatment to certain situations otherwise governed by a
general rule.” Jorge E. Viñuales, Seven Ways of Escaping a Rule: Of Exceptions and Their Avatars in
International Law, in EXCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65, 66 (Lorand Bartels & Federica Paddeu
eds., 2020). I do not limit the definition to exceptions in the strict sense. In the context of economic law,
for instance, I treat antidumping and countervailing duties as exceptions to ordinary GATT rules on
tariffs, even though they are not exceptions in the strict sense like those exceptions found in GATT
article XX.
19.
Tom Verducci, Astros Epitomize the Importance of Adjustments, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct.
13,
2021),
https://www.si.com/mlb/2021/10/13/houston-astros-alds-win-adjustments
[https://perma.cc/6EYT-GCR6]. See also LEONARD COHEN, Anthem, on THE FUTURE (Columbia
Records 1992) (“There is a crack, a crack in everything. That’s how the light gets in.”).
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change, public health—that benefit the public at large are underrepresented
in domestic politics. The benefits from these policies, while large, are
diffuse, meaning that no one group may have an incentive to strongly lobby
for the policy. By linking the pursuit of those public policy goals to an
element of protection, international trade law mobilizes domestic interest
groups with protectionist goals to act in the public interest. In the language
of public choice, international trade law’s exceptions can help states provide
an otherwise undersupplied public good. In this way, Channeling serves a
valuable public role.
Channeling also creates risks, though. The pressure to use legitimate
public policy exceptions for protectionist purposes represents a threat to the
legitimacy of the entire trading system. As anyone who has ever tried to fix
a leak knows, sealing one crack can simply push the water into another
crack. And when the same amount of water tries to fit through fewer cracks,
the pressure on those that remain increases. Those cracks expand to
accommodate the additional pressure. Pressure can erode the channels
meant to constrain it.
In the context of trade law, protectionist pressures threaten to expand the
gaps deliberately left by exceptions. Over time, protectionist domestic
groups may increasingly try to fit more into exceptions that were meant for
narrower kinds of claims. The increased use of antidumping duties by the
United States and the European Union as a general response to nonmarket
economies like China’s, as well as the novel uses of the national security
exception by the United States to justify steel and aluminum tariffs,
illustrate this dynamic.
This overclaiming can be inadvertently encouraged by case law that
seeks to shut down virtually any discrimination in the invocation of a public
policy exception. Due to the need to compromise, domestic lawmaking will
often produce policies that weaken the pursuit of the measure’s primary
objective in order to attract sufficient support to enact the measure. In
invalidating these domestic political bargains, especially in situations in
which there is little evidence that the political process had any animus
toward imports, tribunals risk increasing protectionist pressure on the WTO,
rather than defusing it.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly describes international
trade law’s primary rules and explains why governments have increasingly
turned to exceptions to those rules to justify some of their most
consequential policies. Part II describes the two conventional paradigms
through which international trade lawyers and trade dispute panels have
viewed and applied exceptions: what I call the Policy Space Paradigm and
the Safety Valve Paradigm. This Article is the first to group these paradigms
together in this way. The literature on exceptions in international law
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generally, and international trade law specifically, has tended to focus on
the proper scope of an exception, as well as technical issues such as the
burden of proof.20 These issues are important for any tribunal asked to
decide whether a WTO member is liable under international trade law for a
particular action. This question is somewhat less useful, though, if we are
trying to understand how exceptions shape government decisions,
especially in times of political stress and crisis. It is even less useful if we
are trying to design a legal regime that balances competing objectives and
pressures, such as the twin imperatives of creating economic growth
through trade liberalization while also responding to climate change or
ensuring a just distribution of economic gains.21
Under the Policy Space Paradigm, exceptions mark the boundaries
between two or more legal regimes or issues. For instance, international
trade law should not foreclose governments’ ability to pursue noneconomic
policy objectives, such as environmental or national security objectives. The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) famously contains a list
of general exceptions for specific kinds of policies, such as those related to
conserving exhaustible natural resources or those “necessary to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health.”22 More recently, the push for a right
to regulate in investment treaties seeks to “provide greater policy space for
host states to take measures in the public interest” that might otherwise be
thought to infringe an investor’s rights.23
The Safety Valve Paradigm, by contrast, is concerned with improving
the efficacy of the primary legal regime by creating exceptions to
undeterrable conduct. On this view, exceptions allow states to avoid losses
arising from overwhelming domestic pressure to violate international trade
law. Because most of international law lacks a system of expectation
damages, most sanctions for the violation of international law are negative
sum.24 The violating party suffers sanctions, but other states do not receive
those sanctions as compensation as they would in a domestic legal system.
20.
See, e.g., EXCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18.
21.
See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1 (2019).
22.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
23.
See, e.g., Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting
Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L.
223, 224–25 (2012) (“[T]he use of an appropriately deferential approach to proportionality analysis in
the consideration of indirect expropriation claims . . . would provide greater policy space for host states
to take measures in the public interest . . . .”); Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is
Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008).
24.
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171,
192–93 (2010).
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The only benefit from the sanctions is to deter future violations. But if
violations are undeterrable, sanctions have no offsetting benefits. In such
situations, legalizing or excusing the conduct at issue may make the most
sense. It may, for instance, preserve the legitimacy of international law by
not pretending that the law can prevent that which it cannot.25 It may also
encourage states to make greater concessions during the initial negotiations
over a legal regime, knowing that they can safely escape their obligations in
the future in response to specified conditions.26 GATT rules on safeguards,
which allow a government to impose trade restrictions in the face of a
sudden surge in imports that causes serious injury to a domestic industry,
offer the classic example.27
Part III makes the Article’s chief contribution: the development and
analysis of the Channeling Paradigm. If the Policy Space Paradigm is
concerned with the boundary between legal regimes, and the Safety Valve
Paradigm is concerned with the efficacy of a primary legal regime, the
Channeling Paradigm is concerned with the operation of domestic politics.
The Channeling Paradigm starts from the observation that governments
often have incentives to violate legal rules, but that they have a choice in
how they do so and how they justify their violations. By legalizing some
forms of violation but not others, exceptions can encourage states to violate
the law in ways that advance some other objective. For instance, in the trade
context, domestic producers often demand protection from competition with
foreign imports. A government can aquiesce to that demand outright,
although if it does it is likely in violation of trade rules. Alternatively, it can
seek to graft its otherwise impermissible protection on to an existing
exception in the law. In this way, the government’s protectionist action
violates trade rules, but at least advances another permissible objective.
I argue that the Channeling Paradigm best describes the domestic
political process that leads states to violate international rules in most cases.
The Channeling Paradigm begins with the observation that legal rules do
not eliminate domestic political support for policies that violate those rules.
25.
See Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279
(2017) (discussing how too many violations of international law may undermine the legitimacy of the
system as a whole).
26.
Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape
Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 259 (1991) (“When self-interested
political officials must decide whether to make trade concessions under conditions of uncertainty about
their political consequences, the knowledge that those concessions are in fact ‘escapable’ facilitates
initial trade concessions . . . .”).
27.
GATT, supra note 22, art. XIX; Sykes, supra note 26, at 273. The persistent objector
doctrine, which acts as a state-specific exception from rules of customary international law, offers a
more general international law example of an exception that might be justified on loss avoidance
grounds. See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 164,
167–68 (2005).
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A domestic constituency seeking a government policy that violates
international rules will likely seek to form a coalition with other groups in
order to broaden the appeal of the policy within the government. For
example, a demand for protection from imported shrimp becomes grafted
on to an environmental demand to save sea turtles killed in the shrimping
process.28 A government may join protection from cheap imported biofuels
to concerns about deforestation.29
Legal exceptions thus influence the kinds of domestic political coalitions
that form. The presence of environmental and health exceptions in the
GATT, for instance, encourages groups desiring protection to push for
measures that pursue both a protection and an environmental or public
health purpose. Indeed, the bipartisan infrastructure legislation that
Congress recently enacted contains a provision that directs the government
to justify Buy American rules by “invoking any relevant exceptions to [the
WTO Agreements], especially those related to national security and public
health.”30 Likewise, government officials designing policies are, all else
equal, likely to prefer policies that enjoy broader domestic support and are
more likely consistent with international legal rules. The Channeling
Paradigm best explains how legal exceptions shape government measures
in light of political pressure.
Having explained how Channeling works descriptively, I turn to
examining its implications for international dispute resolution and the
negotiation of international trade agreements. The Policy Space and Safety
Valve Paradigms have animated the application of exceptions by
international trade tribunals. Under both approaches, “exceptional” policies
can pursue but a single objective; any additional trade restrictiveness
renders an exception inapplicable. The Channeling Paradigm, by contrast,
suggests that most “exceptional” policies will have mixed motives.31
Borrowing from scholarship in domestic law on mixed motive
jurisprudence, I argue that WTO panels should adopt a Predominant Motive
28.
United States—Shrimp, supra note 9.
29.
See Panel Report, European Union—Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia,
WTO Doc. WT/DS480/R (adopted Feb. 28, 2018) [hereinafter Biodiesel from Indonesia]; Appellate
Body Report, European Union—Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc.
WT/DS473/AB/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Biodiesel from Argentina]; see also Carolyn
Fischer & Timothy Meyer, Baptists and Bootleggers in the Biodiesel Trade: EU–Biodiesel (Indonesia),
19 WORLD TRADE REV. 297 (2020).
30.
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, H.R. 3684, 117th Cong. § 70952(6) (2021) (enacted).
31.
Throughout this Article, I use the term “motive” interchangeably with the term “objective.”
Both refer to a government’s purpose in enacting a measure as revealed through objective criteria such
as the design, architecture, and application of a measure. This is consistent with how government
purposes are evaluated by trade panels. See Appellate Body Report, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, ¶ 71, WTO Doc. WT/DS110/AB/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2000). I do not use the term “motive”
to refer to subjective intent.
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test—under which a WTO member is entitled to an exception so long as its
measure’s primary objective is a permitted one—to determine whether the
WTO’s general exceptions apply. I explain how such a test would work
within the framework of existing WTO case law and also propose changes
to the text of exceptions for use in future trade agreements.
A Predominant Motive test would strike a more appropriate and
politically sustainable balance between WTO members’ right to regulate in
the public interest and the objectives of trade liberalization. In so doing, it
would shore up the legitimacy of international dispute resolution, which has
been in crisis since the United States began blocking the appointment of
WTO Appellate Body members, ultimately leaving the Appellate Body
unable to operate due to a lack of members. The EU recently lauded the
Appellate Body for its increasing willingness to permit the use of
exceptions.32 And to be sure, the Appellate Body’s application of the WTO
exceptions has become more flexible, ultimately allowing a number of
respondents to de facto prevail even if they nominally lose their cases. But
the pace at which the Appellate Body adapted its jurisprudence has failed to
keep up with the changing role of the trading system in foreign affairs and
the domestic politics of key members, especially the United States. If the
Appellate Body, or some other dispute body, is to resume operation in the
coming years, an approach to exceptional jurisprudence that reflects these
changed roles will be necessary.
I. TRADE RULES AND THE TURN TO EXCEPTIONS
Any discussion of exceptions should begin with a brief description of the
primary rules from which states may wish to deviate, and why they may
wish to do so. As I explain in this Part, the international trade regime and
its primary rules have come under increasing stress in recent years. Trade
policies aimed at creating robust labor markets within countries, securing
critical supply chains, promoting human rights in places like China and
Hong Kong, and addressing environmental concerns like climate change
have all been challenged as inconsistent with international rules. Because in
practice these policies are often hard to justify under trade’s primary rules,
exceptions have taken center stage. This Part briefly describes the key rules
of international trade law and how current events have prompted a turn to
exceptionalism.
International trade’s core norm is nondiscrimination, which comes in
two flavors. First, virtually all international trade agreements prohibit
32.
See Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Trade Policy
Review—An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy, COM (2021) 66 final (Feb. 18, 2021).
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members from treating the commerce of one member state less favorably
than they treat the commerce of another state.33 For instance, the United
States may not treat Mexican goods less favorably than it treats Canadian
goods. This norm, referred to as the “most-favored nation” (MFN) principle,
applies to trade in goods,34 trade in services,35 intellectual property,36 and
investment.37 Perhaps no provision was as central to the GATT, the WTO’s
precursor, as the MFN obligation. The GATT’s drafters enshrined the
obligation in article I, reflecting in part the United States’ desire to take apart
the preferential trading system that European countries had maintained in
favor of their former colonies prior to World War II.38
Preferential trade agreements—such as the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA), the Comprehensive and Progressive TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement between Canada and the EU (CETA)—have largely gutted the
WTO’s MFN obligations today.39 In the context of trade in goods, for
instance, preferential trade agreements typically allow duty-free trade in
goods among members. Imports from nonmembers, by contrast, are
assessed under a nation’s WTO MFN tariff rate. Preferential trade
agreements have become major sites for negotiating new trade rules at the
same time that negotiations at the WTO have struggled to yield meaningful
results. The shift to preferential trade agreements represents, in effect,
33.
See generally Tony Cole, The Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment in
International Investment Law, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 537 (2012).
34.
See, e.g., GATT, supra note 22, arts. I, XIII; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art.
2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120; Protocol Replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement
with the Agreement Between Canada, the United States of America, and the United Mexican States art.
2.10, Nov. 30, 2018, 134 Stat. 11, (entered into force July 1, 2020) [hereinafter USMCA], https://canmex-usa-sec.org/secretariat/assets/pdfs/usmca-aceum-tmec/agreement-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VP8HUSM]; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 2.4, Can.-EU, Oct. 30 2016, O.J. (L 11)
23
[hereinafter
CETA],
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A22017A0114%2801%29.
35.
See, e.g., General Agreement on Trade in Services art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167
(1994) [hereinafter GATS]; USMCA, supra note 34, art. 15.4; CETA, supra note 34, art. 9.5.
36.
See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 4, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
37.
See, e.g., USMCA, supra note 34, art. 14.5; CETA, supra note 34, art. 8.7. There is no
multilateral investment agreement, such as through the WTO. Instead, investment agreements are either
included as chapters within preferential trade agreements, or are concluded as standalone agreements.
38.
G.C. Hufbauer, J. Shelton Erb & H.P. Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional MostFavored-Nation Principle, 12 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 59, 63 (1980) (“U.S. negotiators insisted on a
strong statement in article I of the unconditional MFN principle. This insistence grew from U.S. hostility
to colonial trading systems . . . .”).
39.
See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: HOW PREFERENTIAL
AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE (2008).
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forum shifting from multilateral institutions with high transaction costs to
bilateral or minilateral fora with significantly lower transaction costs.40
The WTO agreements contain exceptions that permit preferential trade
agreements and the resulting violation of the MFN principle.41 These
exceptions allow countries to grant preferential treatment to other nations
so long as they abolish substantially all barriers to trade between the
countries.42 Due to the WTO’s exception for preferential trade agreements,
a huge percentage of global trade today moves under terms set out by
preferential trade agreements, rather than under WTO rules. This includes
all trade between the EU’s twenty-seven members; trade across North
America under the USMCA and the CPTPP (as between Mexico and
Canada); and much of South America under Mercosur, to give but a few
major examples.43
Nondiscrimination’s second form is “national treatment,” which requires
that members of trade agreements not treat the commerce of other members
less favorably than they treat the commerce of their own nationals.44 The
United States, for instance, may not charge higher sales taxes on Canadian
products than it charges on U.S. products,45 nor may it subject Canadian
products to tougher regulations than those to which U.S. products are
subject.46 Like the MFN obligation, the national treatment obligation applies
to goods,47 services,48 intellectual property,49 and investment.50 However, in
recognition of the fact that governments may legitimately prefer their own
commerce in some circumstances, some agreements—most notably the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)—only apply the national
40.
See CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW, AND
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (2014); Laurence R. Helfer,
Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (arguing that countries shift negotiations among international
institutions to achieve their negotiating objectives).
41.
GATT, supra note 22, art. XXIV; GATS, supra note 35, art. V (providing that an economic
integration agreement must have “substantial sectoral coverage” and “provide[] for the absence or
elimination of substantially all discrimination”).
42.
In fact, the WTO’s exceptions contemplate both “free trade” agreements and “customs
unions.” The latter, which include the EU, also have a common external trade policy. See GATT, supra
note 22, art. XXIV; GATS, supra note 35, art. V.
43.
See infra Section IV.B for a longer list of such agreements.
44.
See MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & MICHAEL
HAHN, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 179–92 (2015).
45.
See GATT, supra note 22, art. III.2.
46.
See id. art. III.4.
47.
See, e.g., id. art. III; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; USMCA, supra note 34, art. 2.3; CETA, supra note 34, art.
2.3.
48.
See, e.g., GATS, supra note 35, art. XVII; USMCA, supra note 34, art. 15.3; CETA, supra
note 34, art. 9.3.
49.
See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 36, art. 3.
50.
USMCA, supra note 34, art. 17.3; CETA, supra note 34, art. 8.6.
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treatment obligation to those economic sectors into which members
voluntarily opt.51
The resurgence of industrial policy—policies that encourage resources
to shift from one industry or sector to another52—combined with the
tendency to use environmental, health, and safety regulations to protect
domestic industries has put a significant amount of pressure on national
treatment rules recently. One of President Biden’s first actions on taking
office was to expand Buy American requirements, a form of a local content
requirement that mandates the use of domestic over imported goods.53 This
commitment to Buy American, along with President Biden’s executive
order mandating a review of critical supply chains,54 suggests that the
United States would like to see broader exceptions to the national treatment
rule. Other nations’ industrial policies, such as “Make in India”55 or “Made
in China 2025”56 similarly put stress on the national treatment obligation.
The use of industrial policy to favor domestic industries has become
particularly controversial in the renewable energy sectors.57 Renewable
energy is key to facilitating an economy-wide shift to green energy. At the
same time, nations also view the transition to a green economy as an
opportunity to create and support manufacturing jobs and their agricultural
sectors. Nations and provinces within nations, including Canada, the United
States, the EU, and India, have used local content requirements to privilege
their own domestic renewable energy sectors over foreign renewable energy
technologies in violation of the national treatment rule.58
Beyond nondiscrimination, rules on market access are the other basic
component of trade agreements.59 In the context of trade in goods, the
51.
GATS, supra note 35, art. XVII.1 (footnote omitted) (“In the sectors inscribed in its
Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to
services and service suppliers of any other Member . . . treatment no less favourable than that it accords
to its own like services and service suppliers.”).
52.
TODD N. TUCKER, ROOSEVELT INST., INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND PLANNING: WHAT IT IS AND
HOW TO DO IT BETTER 6 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456981
[https://perma.cc/3RTP-6ZDT].
53.
Exec. Order No. 14,005, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,475 (Jan. 28, 2021).
54.
Exec. Order No. 14,017, 86 Fed. Reg. 11,849 (Mar. 1, 2021).
55.
MAKE IN INDIA, http://www.makeinindia.com [https://perma.cc/YR8X-JB2C].
56.
Scott Kennedy, Made in China 2025, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDS. (June 1, 2015),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025 [https://perma.cc/C7BE- MF5D].
57.
See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Explaining Energy Disputes at the World Trade Organization, 17
INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 391 (2017) (discussing the raft of WTO challenges to
clean energy subsidies).
58.
See id.; Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95
B.U. L. REV. 1937 (2015) (cataloguing U.S. state laws that contain green local content requirements).
59.
Trade agreements, especially preferential trade agreements, apply a host of more specific
rules to trade in goods, services, technology (i.e., intellectual property), and capital (i.e., investment). A
comprehensive cataloguing of these rules is well beyond the scope of this Article.
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GATT and preferential trade agreements like the USMCA generally
prohibit quotas or embargoes on imports of products from other member
states.60 Preferential trade agreements are also supposed to generally
prohibit tariffs on imports.61 The GATT, by contrast, permits tariffs as a
general matter.62 However, WTO members agree to “bind” their tariffs at
certain limits in exchange for concessions on maximum tariffs from other
WTO members.63 As a consequence, WTO members each have their own
product-specific limit on the tariffs they can levy. Similarly, in the services
context, the GATS prohibits WTO members from placing certain limits on
the provision of services by foreign providers within sectors of the economy
that are individual to each nation.64
For years, policymakers and commentators offhandedly noted that trade
policy was no longer concerned primarily with tariffs.65 But tariffs, and the
limits upon them, are once again central to trade policy. In part, President
Trump’s tariffs on most Chinese imports, as well as his “national security”
tariffs on steel and aluminum, a more high-profile and controversial
example, explain this revival.66 But even before President Trump took
office, duties on imports designed to combat unfair trade practices had
become increasingly widespread.67 Some countries are also taking a hard
look at using tariffs as a tool to fight climate change. Most notably, the EU
is set to impose a “carbon border adjustment”—essentially a carbon tariff—
on products from countries with carbon regulations that are more lax than

60.
See, e.g., GATT, supra note 22, art. XI. There are market access rules for services as well,
see GATS, supra note 35, art. XVI, but they apply only to sectors that states have opted in, and the rules
are vaguer and have not been tested to the same extent through disputes.
61.
See GATT, supra note 22, art. XXIV.8(a) (defining customs unions and free trade areas as
groups of territories in which “the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated
on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories . . . .”).
62.
See GATT, supra note 22, art. II.
63.
Id. art. II.1(a) (“Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting
parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate
Schedule annexed to this Agreement.”).
64.
GATS, supra note 35, art. XVI.
65.
See, e.g., Edward John Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism; The Fall in Tariffs and the
Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 285 (1987).
66.
See Timeline: Key Dates in the U.S.-China Trade War, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2020, 5:08 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-timeline/timeline-key-dates-in-the-u-s-china-tradewar-idUSKBN1ZE1AA [https://perma.cc/SNU8-ZJNL]; Ana Swanson & Peter Eavis, Trump Expands
Steel Tariffs, Saying They Are Short of Aim, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/business/economy/trump-steel-tariffs.html
[https://perma.cc/9VAT-GPPA].
67.
See, e.g., Chad P. Bown, The Global Resort to Antidumping, Safeguards, and Other Trade
Remedies Amidst the Economic Crisis, in EFFECTIVE CRISIS RESPONSE AND OPENNESS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE TRADING SYSTEM 91 (Simon J. Evenett, Bernard M. Hoekman & Olivier Cattaneo eds. 2009)
(linking economic downturns with increased usage of antidumping measures).
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the EU’s.68 President Biden has promised a similar carbon border
adjustment “fee.”69
These measures require justification under exceptions. Rules allowing
duties on unfair trade practices are perhaps the most widely used exception
to tariff limits. President Trump and now President Biden have defended
U.S. national security tariffs under the GATT’s national security exception.
And although the EU hopes to defend its carbon border adjustment measure
as consistent with the WTO’s primary rules on tariffs and
nondiscrimination, an economy-wide regulation like a carbon border
adjustment would likely turn on the availability of exceptions to justify at
least some portions of the regulation. If implemented, President Biden’s
plan would also likely require reliance on WTO exceptions in order to fall
within trade rules.70
*
*
*
International trade’s primary rules on nondiscrimination and market
access have driven the incredible rise of global trade and wealth since the
end of World War II. But the focus of modern international trade policy has
shifted away from the core benefits of integration in favor of concerns
around economic inequality within countries, competition among nations to
develop new industries that can support good paying jobs, and using trade
policy as an instrument to protect the environment, especially from the
existential threat of climate change. In today’s world, international trade
law’s exceptions have taken center stage. Policies to achieve the main
political objectives of contemporary trade policy often violate trade’s
primary rules. In order to be consistent with trade rules, these policies
therefore must be justified under trade law’s exceptions. Understanding how
those exceptions work in practice has thus never been more important.
68.
Kate Abnett, EU Sees Carbon Border Levy as ‘Matter of Survival’ for Industry, REUTERS
(Jan. 18, 2021, 11:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-eu-carbon/eu-seescarbon-border-levy-as-matter-of-survival-for-industry-idUSKBN29N1R1 [https://perma.cc/2MWN649C].
69.
The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future is “Made in All of America” by All of America’s
Workers, BIDEN/HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/made-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/L9AH-DWPM].
70.
As discussed in Section IV.B, infra, investment treaties and investment chapters in trade
agreements also include exceptions more frequently. See Caroline Henckels, Should Investment Treaties
Contain Public Policy Exceptions?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2825, 2826 (2018) (footnote omitted) (“Exceptions
have become an increasingly popular mechanism in investment treaties, appearing in 43% of investment
agreements concluded between 2011 and 2016, compared to 7% of agreements signed between 1959
(when the first investment treaty was signed) and 2010.”). These exceptions are especially useful for
states trying to justify deviations from obligations to provide “fair and equitable treatment” to foreign
investments, see, e.g., USMCA, supra note 34, art. 14.6; CETA, supra note 34, art. 8.10, or to
circumvent the prohibition on expropriation except upon payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation. See, e.g., USMCA, supra note 34, art. 14.8; CETA, supra note 34, art. 8.12.
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II. CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES TO EXCEPTIONS
International trade law is riddled with exceptions. Those exceptions
serve diverse and seemingly unrelated purposes. Some are for emergency
use, such as national security exceptions71 or the exception for measures to
relieve a critical shortage of food.72 Others can be used at any time, such as
the exceptions for measures to protect public morals73 or conserve
exhaustable natural resources.74 A WTO member can exceed the limits on
its tariffs to stop unfair trade practices by other countries75 or to enforce its
own domestic laws.76 Some exceptions are capacious, such as the one for
measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.77
Others are specific, such as the exception for restrictions on the import or
export of gold and silver78 or the exception for measures to protect national
treasures of artistic, historic, or archeological value.79
Despite the variety of exceptions within trade law, this Part argues that
there is a conventional wisdom regarding exceptions. I distill that
conventional wisdom into two approaches to exceptions: what I refer to as
the Policy Space Theory and the Safety Valve Theory. Under the Policy
Space Theory, governments invoke exceptions to accommodate objectives
from policy domains other than trade policy, such as to fulfill domestic,
social, or environmental objectives.80 An unlawful trade measure might be
justified, for instance, as necessary in order to take aggressive measures to
combat climate change.
The Safety Valve Theory, by contrast, holds that governments invoke
exceptions to defuse political pressure that trade liberalization itself creates.
This pressure typically comes from domestic groups that are harmed by
71.
See, e.g., GATT, supra note 22, art. XXI(b)(iii); GATS, supra note 35, art. XIV bis; TRIPS,
supra note 36, art. 73.
72.
See, e.g., GATT, supra note 22, art. XI.2(a).
73.
See, e.g., id. art. XX(a); GATS, supra note 35, art. XIV(a); TRIPS, supra note 36, art. 27.2.
74.
See, e.g., GATT, supra note 22, art. XX(g).
75.
GATT, supra note 22, art. VI.3; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 2, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement];
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
76.
GATT, supra note 22, XX(d); GATS, supra note 35, art. XIV(c); TRIPS, supra note 36, art.
3.2.
77.
See GATT, supra note 22, art. XX(b).
78.
See id. art. XX(c).
79.
See id. art. XX(f).
80.
My focus throughout the Article is on how states invoke, and tribunals apply, exceptions.
However, since states are both the authors and subjects of their international commitments, states’
expected use of exceptions will often also serve as justifications for including exceptions in a treaty in
the first place.
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competition from imports. Exceptions for measures that target unfair trade
practices, for instance, allow states to reintroduce some protection into the
trading system in order to reduce attacks on the trading system as a whole
from these interests.
In this Part, I unpack the logic of the Policy Space and Safety Valve
Theories. Although many exceptions can be invoked for either Policy Space
or Safety Valve reasons, I offer examples of the kinds of exceptions that are
more likely to be invoked within each category. Critically, both approaches
imagine exceptions as defining a limited unilateral right to deviate from
trade obligations for a limited purpose. Exceptions themselves, and trade
dispute panels that evaluate their application, must prevent these unilateral
rights from being abused for ulterior motives.81 In this way, both the Policy
Space and Safety Valve Theories deny governments the ability to invoke
exceptions in order to justify conduct taken from mixed motives—i.e., from
both motives that are permissible under trade rules and motives that are not.
As a result, governments and trade tribunals both end up applying trade
law’s exceptions in a hypothetical vacuum that ignores the domestic
political realities of how governments make policy.
A. The Policy Space Theory
Under the Policy Space Theory, exceptions mark the boundaries between
policy domains and their associated legal regimes. The intuition is that states
may have a difficult time satisfying their treaty obligations while also
pursuing a range of reasonable social, environmental, or other public policy
goals that are external to international trade policy. Under the Policy Space
Theory, the role of exceptions is to allow states to unilaterally pursue those
other public policy goals without incurring responsibility for violating their
trade obligations.
1. The Idea
International trade agreements set forth their obligations in general
terms. The obligation to treat imports no less favorably than domestic
products (national treatment) or imports from other countries (MFN) applies

81.
See generally KRZYSZTOF J. PELC, MAKING AND BENDING INTERNATIONAL RULES: THE
DESIGN OF EXCEPTIONS AND ESCAPE CLAUSES IN TRADE LAW 6 (2016) (referring to Pascal Lamy’s
description of the tradeoff between the flexibility created by exceptions and the possibility of abuse as
trade’s “architectural challenge”).
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almost always, regardless of circumstance.82 The obligation to provide
treatment no less favorable than concessions on market access contained in
a tariff schedule or schedule of services commitments is likewise generally
applicable.83
Yet, governments know at the time they negotiate trade agreements that
they will wish to deviate from those general commitments in the future.
Trade agreements, after all, are primarily concerned with constraining
government policies that protect domestic industries from foreign
competition. In effect, they seek to establish processes to reduce tariffs on
imports and ensure that regulations are nondiscriminatory. These
obligations, in turn, spur economic growth and can bring nations closer
together as a matter of foreign policy.84
But governments have many other objectives beyond promoting
economic growth and closer ties with foreign nations. Just as governments
sacrifice economic growth in order to promote worker or consumer safety
via domestic regulations, so too might governments be willing to sacrifice
the economic growth that accompanies trade liberalization in order to
establish policies that address climate change or fight the COVID-19
pandemic. Moreover, different nations have different models for
government intervention in the market. State-led systems like China’s might
have more interventionist governments than market-led capitalist systems
like the United States’. Developing countries like India or Indonesia might
push for more export-oriented growth than developed economies with large
internal economies.
For years, “policy space” has been the concept that allows the WTO to
accommodate this pluralism of goals and economic models. Professor Dani
Rodrik, an early and prominent critic of excessive trade liberalization, has
argued that globalization should “focus[] on enhancing policy space rather
than market access. . . . A good argument can be made that it is lack of
policy space—and not lack of market access—which is (or likely to become
soon) the real binding constraint on a prosperous global economy.”85 Much
82.
WTO obligations do often contain some modest qualifications. For instance, GATT article I
exempts some specific preferences from the MFN obligation. See GATT, supra note 22, art. I.2–4.
Likewise, the national treatment obligation contains several qualifications, such as for government
procurement. See id. art. III.8. Many, although not all, of these qualifications are transitional, applying
to measures in existence at the time the GATT came into existence.
83.
Scheduled commitments can themselves contain qualifications, but the treaty obligation is to
provide treatment no less favorable than that contained in the schedule, which includes the qualifications.
See GATT, supra note 22, art. II; GATS, supra note 35, art. XVII.
84.
See generally Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers,
107 CAL. L. REV. 583 (2019) (describing domestic economic and foreign policy and paradigms for
viewing trade policy).
85.
Dani Rodrik, How to Save Globalization from Its Cheerleaders 4 (Harvard Univ. John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP07-038, 2007).
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of this early debate focused on policy space for developing countries, which
might require time to adjust to the liberalized rules required by the WTO.86
More recently, the rise of nationalist movements in developed countries
has caused policymakers and commentators to wonder whether the United
States and European nations have enough space to pursue their own
domestic policies. Donald Trump’s election in 2016, the UK’s decision to
leave the EU, and the rise of nationalist parties in continental Europe have
all empowered politicians to push back against the WTO, the EU, and other
global institutions. Professor Gregory Shaffer has distilled the argument for
policy space into a concrete strategy for how states might bargain over
market access and policy for domestic priorities.87 Drawing on the work of
Professor John Ruggie, Shaffer argues that the original GATT “provided a
framework for embedded liberalism where countries could both liberalize
trade and retain policy space for domestic social policy.”88 He argues that
trade officials have lost sight of this balance, and thus a recalibration in
favor of policy space is necessary.89
In theory, this policy space need not come from exceptions. As
Professors Julian Arato, Kathleen Claussen, and J. Benton Heath have
argued, “[a] new jurisprudence could focus on identifying space for
flexibility within the primary rules themselves.”90 Yet as they also
acknowledge, exceptions are an attractive way for governments to manage
their legal exposure to trade and investment law claims.91 Exceptions clearly
exist to create some degree of flexibility within trade law, and prevailing
intepretations of trade law’s primary rules focus on minimizing burdens to
international commerce.92 These interpretations encourage challenges to
trade restrictive measures that pursue general public policy goals. Thus,
86.
See id. at 4 (“I will provide a range of evidence on trade and capital flows that indicates the
obstacles faced by developing countries do not originate from inadequate access to markets abroad or to
foreign capital.”); see also Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the
WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 405 (2005); Jörg Mayer, Policy
Space: What, for What, and Where?, 27 DEV. POL’Y REV. 373 (2009).
87.
See Shaffer, supra note 21, at 29; see also Beth Baltzan, The Old-School Answer to Global
Trade, WASH. MONTHLY (Apr./May/June, 2019), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/april-mayjune-2019/the-old-school-answer-to-global-trade/ [https://perma.cc/U6A9- WGEE].
88.
Shaffer, supra note 21, at 5 (footnote omitted).
89.
Id.
90.
Julian Arato, Kathleen Claussen & J. Benton Heath, The Perils of Pandemic Exceptionalism,
114 AM. J. INT’L L. 627, 635 (2020).
91.
Id. at 633 (“This is not just a short-term problem. As governments forge divergent paths in
the long-term response and recovery from COVID-19, their exposure to trade and investment claims is
likely to increase.”); see also Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of
International Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037 (2010) (discussing the turn toward
exceptions in investment agreements to mediate the conflict between economic rules and other
objectives).
92.
Arato et. al, supra note 90, at 632.
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absent significant changes to how primary rules are understood, exceptions
bear the weight of reconciling states’ goals of trade liberalization with other
public policy goals.
In this sense, the Policy Space Theory is closely tied to concerns about
the fragmentation of international law.93 Unlike domestic legal systems,
where a generalist legislature often has plenary power over most, if not all,
policy domains, the international system has separate institutions for each
policy area, and often for discrete issues within a policy domain. The World
Health Organization, for instance, is the lead international institution for
global public health,94 while a set of UN and regional institutions govern
human rights.95 International environmental law is a collection of largely
unconnected treaties governing discrete issues, such as climate change,96
ozone depleting substances,97 or chemicals.98 Moreover, whereas domestic
legal systems usually have rules that prioritize some laws over others, such
rules are considerably weaker in international law.
Exceptions offer an attractive solution to this problem of fragmentation.
Instead of trying to embed trade rules within a larger governance framework
that contemplates environmental, human rights, or public health policies,
exceptions minimize the interaction necessary between legal institutions
governing different policy domains. Trade lawyers and institutions can
carry on within their own domain, and exceptions will tell them when they
have strayed outside their competence. Put differently, trade law’s
exceptions are the fences that aim to make good neighbors among
fragmented and decentralized legal institutions.
2. The Policy Space Theory in Action
In practice, the most significant implication of the Policy Space Theory
is that it prohibits states from justifying measures that rest on mixed
motives. Under the Policy Space Theory, permission to deviate from trade
93.
See Int’l L. Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International law, ¶¶ 5–7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006);
see also Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 849, 849–51 (2004).
94.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1 (1946),
https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/Uv9W-QP9Z].
95.
See, e.g., International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC.
NO. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
96.
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June
4, 1992, S. TREATY DOC NO. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
97.
See Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons
to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-10 (1999), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
98.
See, e.g., Stockholm Convention on Persistant Organic Pollutants, opened for signature May
22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119.
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rules only flows from identifying an objective within a permitted policy
domain outside of trade. Policy objectives within trade policy, such as
measures that seek to limit trade liberalization’s impact on economic
inequality, are therefore not covered by the exceptions. Thus, in invoking
an exception, states declare that the policy they are defending is, in fact, a
policy designed to pursue some permissible public policy goal external to
the trade regime. Other members and WTO panels then evaluate the veracity
of that claim. Using objective criteria regarding the measure’s application
they ask, in effect, whether the governmental measure in question really is
pursuing the government’s stated purpose, or whether the measure is
infected by an ulterior motive.
To see how a Policy Space approach to exceptions limits measures with
mixed motives, consider the design and application of some WTO
exceptions. Many of these exceptions announce policy objectives that WTO
agreements “shall not prevent” states from pursuing. For example, GATT
contains a national security exception upon which similar provisions in the
GATS and TRIPS Agreement are modeled.99 The GATT was drafted in the
immediate aftermath of World War II and during the time of emerging
nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. As
such, the United States did not wish for a trade agreement to hinder its
national security policies. As Professor Mona Pinchis-Paulsen has
described, U.S. negotiators were the primary architects of GATT article
XXI.100 U.S. negotiators included selective, open-ended terms and phrases
that “could, when reported to officials in Washington, seem to comply with
the demands for total U.S. discretion over security policies in the future.”101
In relevant part, Article XXI provides that a member may take “any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests”102 provided that “the action taken by a Member under Paragraph
1(b) must relate to fissionable materials, the supply of a military
establishment or be taken in a time of war or other international
emergency.”103 Article XXI also excuses measures necessary to comply
with obligations under the U.N. Charter, another exception that prioritizes
a separate international legal regime.104

99.
See GATS, supra note 35, art. XIV bis; TRIPS, supra note 36, art. 73.
100. See Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security: The Making
of the GATT Security Exceptions, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 190–91 (2020).
101. Id. at 192.
102. GATT, supra note 22, art. XXI(b).
103. Pinchis-Paulsen, supra note 100, at 185 (quoting a memorandum prepared by executive
branch officials for members of Congress).
104. GATT, supra note 22, art. XXI(c).
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The WTO’s general exceptions in GATT article XX and GATS article
XIV follow the same model, carving out a series of policy purposes that
states are permitted to pursue even if their conduct violates trade rules.
These purposes include: the protection of public morals;105 the protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health;106 and securing compliance with
domestic laws that are themselves WTO-consistent.107
The GATT also includes exceptions for a variety of other issue areas that
are specific to trade in goods, including the conservation of natural
resources,108 limitations on products made with prison labor, and the
preservation of artifacts.109 The WTO’s general exceptions also carve out
space for other international regimes to operate. The GATT, for instance,
provides an exception for measures necessary to comply with certain
commodities agreements.110 The GATS excuses violations necessary to
comply with international tax treaties banning double taxation.111
Other policy space exceptions may be more targeted. The GATS
contains an exception for prudential measures to protect the financial system
and participants within it.112 The CPTPP (i.e., the renamed Trans-Pacific
Partnership) contains a carveout in its investment chapter for tobacco
measures.113 The carveout puts tobacco control measures outside the scope
of the treaty’s investor-state dispute settlement system. Australia insisted on
this carveout to protect itself from what it viewed as spurious attacks on
aggressive public health measures it had adopted to curb smoking, which
tobacco companies had then challenged.114 The carveout ensures that
CPTPP members may implement tobacco control measures without fear of
incurring liability to a foreign investor—a classic policy space rationale.
But while many exceptions identify public policy areas covered by
exceptions, simply announcing that a measure pursues a permitted public
policy goal is insufficient. The state invoking the exception could be
claiming a public policy exception but smuggling in a measure designed to
pursue an impermissibile motive, such as protecting a domestic industry.
Thus, while trade tribunals have been deferential when asking whether a
105. Id. art. XX(a); GATS, supra note 35, art. XIV(a).
106. GATT, supra note 22, art. XX(b); GATS, supra note 35, art. XIV(b).
107. GATT, supra note 22, art. XX(d); GATS, supra note 35, art. XIV(c).
108. GATT, supra note 22, art. XX(g).
109. Id. art. XX(f).
110. Id. art. XX(h).
111. GATS, supra note 35, art. XIV(e).
112. See GATS, supra note 35, Annex on Financial Services, para 2.
113. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 29.5 https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPPFinal-Text-Exceptions-and-General-Provisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6F6-LPCP].
114. See Summaries of the Legal Challenges Against Plain Packaging Laws, CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/plainpackaging/tools-resources/legal/casesummaries [https://perma.cc/D9Q2-NE29].
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measure contributes to some permitted public policy objective that states
have invoked,115 they have been considerably more exacting in asking
whether a measure only pursues the permitted objective, or whether the
measure is trade restrictive in ways that go beyond the permissibile
objective.
Tribunals apply a series of means-ends tests to decide whether a measure
is sufficiently tailored to a permissible objective, or whether it entails
additional restrictions on trade. For instance, most of the general exceptions
are qualified by the word “necessary.” The WTO Appellate Body has
interpreted the necessity test to require weighing the contribution the
measure makes to the state’s public policy goal against the trade
restrictiveness of the measure, in light of the importance of the value at
stake.116 Tribunals must also ask whether there were less trade restrictive
alternatives reasonably available that make the same contribution to the
public policy goal.117 Finally, and most importantly, the Appellate Body
asks whether any discrimination created by the challenged measure “can be
reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective” in
question.118 Any trade restrictiveness must be justified in reference to the
permissible policy objective.
A challenge to the EU’s ban on seal products illustrates how this
approach can be problematic. The EU’s ban was motivated by concerns for
animal welfare, because the process of hunting seal often involved painful
deaths for the animals. The EU argued this concern qualified as a public
moral under GATT article XX(a). But the EU had several other objectives
in passing the measure as well. It wished to preserve traditional seal hunts
by indigenous peoples, and it also wished to allow for the culling of seal
herds in order to keep seal populations at a sustainable level. To make both
of these activities economically viable, the EU allowed seal products
derived from either activity. The WTO Appellate Body accepted that the
EU’s primary objective—protecting animal welfare—fell within the scope
of the exception and that the ban on seal products was necessary to achieve
that objective. But the Appellate Body found that the way in which the EU
115. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, ¶ 158, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001)
(“[D]espite . . . troublesome aspects, . . . [the Panel accepted that] the dual retail system was put in place,
at least in part, in order to secure compliance with the Korean legislation against deceptive practices . .
. .”).
116. See Brazil—Tyres, supra note 10, ¶ 156.
117. Id.
118. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.306, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June
18, 2014).
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pursued its other objectives—preserving indigenous hunts and seal
population management—created unjustifiable discrimination. The EU, in
other words, had the policy space to pursue its animal welfare objective, but
could not combine that objective in the way that it did with other motives.119
WTO panels have been more deferential in applying the national security
exception. Even there, though, panels have inquired into the sincerity of a
state’s motives. For instance, in both panel reports interpreting the national
security exception, the panels have held that the party invoking the
exception must articulate its essential security interests.120 The panels found
that they could then ask whether, with appropriate deference to the state
invoking the exception, the challenged measure might plausibly be thought
to be necessary to further the protection of that interest. In a dispute between
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the panel actually rejected the defense as to one of
Saudi Arabia’s challenged measures, finding that a desire to cut off contact
with Qatar to minimize terrorism-related risks could not justify a failure to
apply criminal penalties to a Saudi entity infringing on the intellectual
property rights of a Qatari broadcaster.121
In sum, the Policy Space Theory has two key attributes. First, it envisions
a de jure space for policies that are inconsistent with trade rules but can be
excused because they pursue policy aims outside of trade policy. Second, in
application this dichotomy between trade and nontrade purposes leads to an
inquiry into whether protectionist features have infected a challenged
measure. As I explain more fully in Part IV, by seeking to root out trade
restrictiveness unrelated to a permissible policy objective, these tests rule
out the possibility that states can use exceptions to justify policies that
pursue a mix of permissible and impermissible objectives.122 In so doing,
the Policy Space Theory—an approach to exceptions that seeks to expand
the opportunity to pursue public policy objectives without incurring trade
liability—risks squeezing that very same space by insisting on unrealistic
purity of motive.
B. The Safety Valve Theory
If the Policy Space Theory is concerned with the relationship between
trade and nontrade policy objectives, the Safety Valve Theory is concerned
only with trade policy. In short, the Safety Valve Theory justifies exceptions
119. Id.
120. See Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 12 (interpreting the national security exception in
the GATT); Panel Report, Saudi Arabia—Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS567/R (circulated June 16, 2020) [hereinafter Saudi Arabia—IPR]
(interpreting the national security exception in the TRIPS Agreement).
121. Saudi Arabia—IPR, supra note 120, ¶ 7.293.
122. See infra Section IV.A.
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on the ground that they bolster a legal regime’s efficacy by reducing the
amount of noncompliance in the system. Put differently, the Safety Valve
Theory makes exceptions for certain kinds of explicitly protectionist trade
policies. By excusing some protectionist policies, Safety Valve exceptions
reduce noncompliance by definition. But this reduction in noncompliance
has real consequences. It reduces the costs of sanctions that flow from
noncompliance and which are usually negative-sum, it increases the
compliance-pull the law has, and it reduces the domestic political pressure
on governments to withdraw from, or engage in widespread violations of,
the international trade system. The Safety Valve Theory has some overlap
with the Policy Space Theory in the sense that states may not participate in
a legal regime that does not contain exceptions for the pursuit of general
policy objectives. But while the Policy Space Theory creates a dichotomy
between trade and nontrade policy objectives, the Safety Valve Theory is
concerned only with trade policies.
1. The Idea
The intuition behind the Safety Valve Theory is that no legal regime can
deter all violations, and violations are costly to a legal system. If too many
violations occur, the entire legal regime may unravel. States may be
unwilling to join or remain within an international agreement. Alternatively,
they may violate the agreement more frequently. In both cases, prior
violations have set the stage for later noncompliance by giving cooperationminded states little incentive to stay within the legal regime. The Safety
Valve Theory suggests that undeterrable violations should therefore be
legalized.
Domestically, legalizing undeterrable violations means that interest
groups that advocate for economic protection do not need to oppose the
entirety of the trading system. They can instead operate within the trading
system’s rules. At the same time, nations do not observe rampant
noncompliance by their peers. International law works most effectively on
the margins, “putting a thumb on the scale in favor of compliance.”123
Reducing noncompliance makes law more effective in generating
compliance in these close cases. It makes, in effect, the thumb a bit heavier.
In this sense, the Safety Valve Theory represents a second best. It
acknowledges that governments sometimes face strong incentives not to
comply with international rules. Furthermore, legal obligations will not be
123. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 117 (2008).
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enough to overcome these incentives in every circumstance. When these
circumstances are predictable in advance, therefore, the Safety Valve
Theory suggests calibrating legal rules to minimize the costs of
noncompliance. It recognizes the limits of legal regimes and asks them only
to do what they can.
To unpack this intuition, notice that violations of the law are costly. In a
legal system with perfect enforcement and a system of expectation damages,
those costs can be imposed on the violator, such that a rational state will
only violate the law if the gains exceed the losses.124 But enforcement is far
from perfect in international law. Moreover, with the exception of
international investment law, international economic law does not have a
system of expectation damages.125 Instead, international trade sanctions take
the form of raising trade barriers to a violating country’s imports.126 But
increasing trade barriers is typically costly to both the violator and the
sanctioning state.127 The violator loses market access, but the sanctioning
state loses access to imports, raising the cost or lowering the quality of the
products available to its own consumers. As a consequence, violations of
international law tend to be negative sum. The violating state’s gains from
flouting the law are less than the joint costs of sanctions, both to the
violating and sanctioning states.128
At the time states make an agreement, they can be reasonably certain that
some violations will be deterred, that some might be deterred, and that some
certainly will not be deterred.129 The possibility of sanctions—negative sum
or otherwise—deters some set of violations. If a state is deterred from
violating the law by the possibility of sanctions, the negative-sum losses
never actually materialize. If, on the other hand, the violation does occur,
states collectively suffer the loss imposed by the sanctions. Because states
have not agreed to a system of expectation damages, they must instead
design their legal agreements ex ante to balance the expected gains from
deterring violations with the expected losses from undeterred violations.
124. See Guzman & Meyer, supra note 24, at 192; see also Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes,
The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. S179, S182 (2002).
125. See Guzman & Meyer, supra note 24.
126. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 23,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
127. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 24, at 193. Reputational sanctions can limit a state’s ability to
negotiate favorable agreements in the future if it does not honor its present commitments. International
law also makes reciprocal and retaliatory sanctions, such as suspending trade concessions, easier both
by formally authorizing such conduct and by helping states coordinate their sanctions. GUZMAN, supra
note 123, at 71–117.
128. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 24, at 193, 195–97.
129. If states behave rationally, states will legalize actions in this middle category when the
expected costs from violations that end up not being deterred exceeds the gains from deterring those
violations that are averted.
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Legalizing the last category—undeterrable violations of the law—can
help in this balancing by minimizing the losses associated with international
law’s negative-sum system of sanctions.130 Making an undeterrable act
unlawful, after all, does not change the costs associated with the act itself.
If the act is undeterrable, the consequences of the action for other states—
lost market access, environmental externalities, security consequences,
etc.—will occur anyway. The only difference is that if the act is unlawful,
both the violating state and any sanctioning states will suffer the costs
associated with sanctions. For example, imposing tariffs in retaliation for a
violation of trade law—as the United States did on a range of European
products in retaliation for the EU’s WTO-inconsistent subsidies for
Airbus—will increase the costs of affected products like wine and cheese
for U.S. consumers without necessarily creating any additional market
access for the U.S. exporters.
This “loss avoidance” rationale has implications beyond merely saving
costs. Creating exceptions for undeterrable violations can facilitate the
creation of a legal regime or save it from collapse. When states are
negotiating on the front end, they may be reluctant to join an agreement if
it appears that the costs from violations are likely to exceed the gains from
more cooperative behavior.131 Exceptions can change that calculus for
states, making an agreement that may not be in the interests of states in
general more valuable.
The modesty of ambition that comes with exceptions may also boost the
legitimacy of a legal regime, and therefore its ability to generate
compliance. Professor Ingrid Wuerth has described the “broken windows”
theory of international law, which suggests “that widespread violations of
some international legal rules likely make it more difficult to enforce
others.”132 On this view, repeated violations of the law send a signal about
a lack of accountability for violations, and can also create a culture within
and across states that compliance with the law is not an important policy
consideration.133 On this view, overlegalization can actually undermine the
efficacy of a legal regime.134 By reducing or excusing violations, exceptions

130. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 24, at 222.
131. A variety of other flexibility mechanisms, such as soft law and reservations, can be used to
the same effect. See id. at 171, 179 n.11; Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 307–
08 (2006).
132. Wuerth, supra note 25, at 283.
133. Id. at 325–26.
134. See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and
the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832,
1834 (2002).
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prevent this kind of harmful overlegalization, thereby promoting norms of
accountability within international law.
These considerations—loss avoidance and broken windows—apply to
the value that states as a whole get from international law. But exceptions
can also influence the position that domestic interest groups take toward
compliance with a legal regime. International agreements typically impose
both costs and benefits on member states. In the case of trade agreements,
these costs are typically concentrated in industries or sectors that have to
compete with cheap imports. These import-competing interests will lobby
their governments for protection when cheap imports begin cutting into their
market share.
Foreseeing this political pressure to impose economic protection in the
future, governments may choose not to join in the first place. They also
might choose to withdraw from the agreement, as former President Trump
threatened to do with respect to NAFTA and the WTO.135 Legalizing
noncompliance in situations in which negotiators expect domestic political
pressure to violate treaty commitments can persuade reluctant states to join
an agreement and may even encourage them to make additional concessions
at the outset of the agreement.136 Doing so may reduce the overall value of
the agreement to states, but it increases the value to the future violator and,
importantly, to government decisionmakers who will actually face domestic
political pressure to deviate from international rules.137
2. The Safety Valve Theory in Practice
Examples of Safety Valve exceptions are rampant in international trade
law. Unlike Policy Space exceptions, which focus on measures that violate
trade rules incidentally while pursuing some other purpose, Safety Valve
exceptions apply to measures that are explicitly designed to be protectionist.
As a result, Safety Valve exceptions generally do not have the kind of
probing of a measure to see what a state’s real motive is. More so than
Policy Space exceptions, though, WTO jurisprudence has severely limited
the use of Safety Valve exceptions. As a result, protectionist motives
increasingly doom any government measure.
The classic example of a Safety Valve exception is GATT article XIX,138
which allows states to temporarily impose “safeguards”—restrictions on
135. Trump Threatens to Pull US Out of World Trade Organization, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45364150 [https://perma.cc/7LCC-Q86V].
136. Sykes, supra note 26, at 279.
137. Id. at 288.
138. GATT, supra note 22, art. XIX.1(a) (“If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the
effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff
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imports—in the event that domestic producers face serious injury from a
sudden and unexpected surge in imports.139 Professor Alan O. Sykes has
argued that GATT article XIX defuses the pressure for protectionism at the
time of negotiations. Government officials know that they are likely to face
pressure to protect domestic industries in the future, and so might be
reluctant to make trade liberalization concessions. GATT article XIX
induces trade concessions by giving government officials some assurance
that they can lawfully raise trade barriers in the future, thereby succumbing
to domestic pressure without breaching international rules.140 For similar
reasons, Professor Sykes has been critical of Appellate Body rulings that
have practically foreclosed the lawful use of safeguards.141
Antidumping and countervailing duties have also been compared to
safety valves.142 Like safeguards, antidumping and countervailing duties
provide a process through which domestic industries can petition their
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that
territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such
product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.”).
139. In international law more generally, the persistent objector doctrine offers an example of a
safety valve exception. Under the persistent objector doctrine, a state can avoid being bound by a rule
of customary international law if, “whilst a practice is developing into a rule of general law, [it]
persistently and openly dissents from the rule.” INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMM. ON FORMATION OF
CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L Law, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW § 15 (2000). Andrew Guzman has argued that the
persistent objector doctrine can be justified on the grounds that it “provide[s] an exception for states that
cannot be deterred[,]” thereby “avoid[ing] the systemic costs associated with ongoing violations, the
cost to sanctioned states, and the costs to sanctioning states.” Guzman, supra note 27, at 167. For similar
reasons, Professor Guzman has also called for an expanded role for a subsequent objector doctrine for
states that develop an interest in, and deep-seated objection to, a customary rule after it has already
formed. Id. at 171.
140. Sykes himself distinguishes his argument from what he refers to as the “safety valve”
hypothesis on the grounds that the safety valve hypothesis focuses on reducing ex post protectionism,
whereas his argument is the GATT XIX increases ex post protectionism as the price of reducing
protectionism ex ante. Sykes, supra note 26, at 273. Others describe a bargain of ex post protectionism
for ex ante tariff concessions as a “safety valve.” See Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants,
53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 30 (2012) (“[The safety valve theory] suggests that antidumping acts as a way to
secure and maintain domestic support for trade liberalization.”).
141. See Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence, 2 WORLD
TRADE REV. 261 (2003). U.S. domestic law contains a similar provision, section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974, which provides the domestic basis for the United States to invoke its rights under GATT article
XIX. 19 U.S.C. § 2251. A number of commentators have argued that section 201, which provides an
administrative process for imposing safeguards, is designed to prevent appeals for protection to
Congress, which might impose even higher levels of protection. See, e.g., ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE &
ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (1986).
142. See, e.g., Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Antidumping Policy in Developing Countries:
Safety Valve or Obstacle to Free Trade?, 22 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 618 (2006). But see Wu, supra note
140, at 36, 40 (finding minimal empirical evidence that India and China use antidumping duties in the
manner predicted by the safety valve theory).
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governments for protection from imports. Antidumping and countervailing
duties are essentially tariff surcharges imposed in response to unfair trade
practices.143 Antidumping duties are imposed in response to unfairly low
pricing of imports,144 while countervailing duties are imposed to offset
foreign government subsidies.145
Antidumping duties have become the most important vehicle through
which governments provide protection to their domestic industries.146 They
are used far more frequently than safeguards or countervailing duties.147
Governments have also interpreted the antidumping rules flexibly to apply
to a wide range of circumstances in which states do not agree that they are
intended to apply.148
For instance, the European Union tried imposing antidumping duties on
biodiesel fuel in order to offset foreign government intervention in the
market for raw materials. Indonesia and Argentina used their tax system to
reduce the cost of palm oil and soybean oil, respectively, in order to make
the production of biodiesel cheaper in those countries. But because
Indonesia and Argentina were not actually giving support directly to
biodiesel producers, proving the existence of an unlawful subsidy was
difficult.149 The EU hoped antidumping duties would provide a permissible
vehicle to protect its domestic biodiesel producers.
The United States has used antidumping and countervailing duties in a
similar fashion. Arguably the longest-running trade dispute in the world
focuses on U.S. claims that Canada unfairly intervenes in its softwood
lumber market, effectively creating a subsidy.150 The United States has also
used both antidumping and countervailing duties to target Chinese
producers that it feels benefit from extensive government support.151 More
143. See GATT, supra note 22, art. VI.
144. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 75.
145. See SCM Agreement, supra note 75.
146. Alexander Roitinger, Antidumping Reform, Trade Policy Flexibility, and Compensation 3
(Univ. of St. Gallen Dep’t of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 2002-18, 2002),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=332383 [https://perma.cc/3RQA-WG2S].
147. World Trade Org., Graphs Over Time, INTEGRATED TRADE INTELLIGENCE PORTAL, https://itip.wto.org/goods/Forms/GraphView.aspx [https://perma.cc/9U9N-6FPW].
148. Roitinger, supra note 146, at 4–9.
149. Meredith A. Crowley & Jennifer A. Hillman, Slamming the Door on Trade Policy
Discretion? The WTO Appellate Body’s Ruling on Market Distortions and Production Costs in EU—
Biodiesel (Argentina), 17 WORLD TRADE REV. 195, 195–96 (2018) (discussing the difficulty of proving
the existence of a subsidy on these facts).
150. See Panel Report, United States—Countervailing Measures on Softwood Lumber from
Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS533/R (circulated Aug 24, 2020); Panel Report, United States—AntiDumping Measures Applying Differential Pricing Methodology to Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WTO Doc. WT/DS534/R (circulated Apr. 9, 2019).
151. See, e.g., Update: 1-U.S. ITC Finds Chinese Exports of Subsidized Engines Harm U.S.
Industry, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2021, 2:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trade-china-engines-
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generally, the United States has used a controversial technique known as
“zeroing”—which involves calculating the average price of imported goods
without including goods that are “fairly” priced, i.e., by zeroing out fairly
priced goods in the calculation of average prices—to calculate antidumping
duties.152
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have almost always taken a dim
view of these efforts. In a series of cases, the Appellate Body condemned
the practice of zeroing.153 In response, the United States began blocking the
reappointment of Appellate Body members, ultimately leading to the
suspension of the Appellate Body’s work due to an insufficient number of
members.154 The Appellate Body and WTO panels have similarly found
against the ability of nations to use antidumping or countervailing duties to
counteract a range of market interventions that fall short of meeting the
WTO’s narrow definition of a subsidy.155 Along with the similar rulings
preventing the application of safeguards, the result has been a significant
constriction in the availability of exceptions designed to justify protection.
Safeguards, antidumping duties, and countervailing duties—collectively
called “trade remedies”—are the best examples of Safety Valve exceptions
because they are designed to co-opt specific domestic interests groups that
lobby for greater economic protection. Legalizing that protection reduces
the political pressure on the international trade system as a whole. As a
result, safety valve exceptions counterintuitively support trade liberalization
by authorizing a bit of protection.
Emergency exceptions work in a similar fashion. By legalizing
noncompliance during an emergency, when the political pressure on
governments to impose protection will be enormous, emergency exceptions
reduce the political pressure on the trading system. The best example is the
carveout in GATT article XI for “[e]xport prohibitions or restrictions
temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or
idUSL1N2K82HE [https://perma.cc/NC7G-KLLK]; Randall Woods, US Imposing Anti-Dumping
Duties on Chinese Aluminum Foil, INDUS. WEEK (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.industryweek.com/theeconomy/article/22024433/us-imposing-antidumping-duties-on-chinese-aluminum-foil.
152. See Panel Report, United States—Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins (Zeroing), ¶¶ 2.1–2.5, WTO Doc. WT/DS294/R (adopted May 9, 2006).
153. Chad P. Bown & Thomas J. Prusa, U.S. Antidumping: Much Ado About Zeroing 3–4 (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5352, 2010).
154. Aditya Rathore & Ashutosh Bajpai, The WTO Appellate Body Crisis: How We Got Here and
What
Lies
Ahead?,
JURIST
(Apr.
14,
2020,
7:16
PM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/04/rathore-bajpai-wto-appellate-body-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/XH9B-RWLM].
155. See Panel Report, European Union—Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia,
WTO Doc. WT/DS480/R (adopted Feb. 28, 2018); Appellate Body Report, Anti-Dumping Measures on
Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/AB/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016).
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other [essential] products.”156 GATT article XX contains several other
examples, including exceptions for certain export restrictions on inputs as
part of a government stabilization plan,157 and for measures “essential to the
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply.”158
GATT article XII authorizes import restrictions to address balance of
payment crises,159 while TRIPS Agreement contains exceptions for the
compulsory licensing of patents, which is especially relevant to
pharmaceuticals during a public health emergency.160
The primary difference between emergency exceptions and trade
remedies is the origin of the political pressure. With trade remedies, political
pressure originates from import-competing sectors that are harmed by
increases in competition from foreign imports. In an emergency, the demand
for protection may come from a wider range of interests, including basic
consumers. For instance, many governments imposed export restrictions on
medical supplies during the early days of the COVID-19 crisis.161
These restrictions did not arise from the need to protect domestic
producers, but rather from the need to ensure a supply of medical equipment
to consumers—doctors, hospitals, and ultimately patients. States did not
challenge each other’s restrictions at the WTO, but the restrictions are likely
justifiable under GATT articles XI or XX.162 Indeed, emergency exceptions
in general have not been subject to significant dispute resolution, as WTO
members have tended to give each other leeway to respond to a crisis.
*

*

*

Descriptively, the Safety Valve Theory has some overlap with the Policy
Space Theory. In democracies, the invocation of an exception will virtually
always be at the behest of a domestic group, whether they do so to advance
public policy goals or out of a desire for protection.163 Likewise, domestic
groups may oppose a trade agreement because the agreement does not
contain enough policy space.
156. GATT, supra note 22, art. XI.2(a).
157. Id. art. XX(i).
158. Id. art. XX(j).
159. Id. art. XII.
160. TRIPS, supra note 36, arts. 31, 31bis, annex 2.
161. See COVID-19: Measures Affecting Trade in Goods, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm (last visited
Nov. 22, 2021).
162. See Joost Pauwelyn, Export Restrictions in Times of Pandemic: Options and Limits Under
International Trade Agreements, in COVID-19 AND TRADE POLICY: WHY TURNING INWARD WON’T
WORK (Richard E. Baldwin & Simon J. Evenett eds., 2020); Timothy Meyer, Trade Law and Supply
Chain Regulation in a Post-COVID-19 World, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 637, 644–45 (2020).
163. See PELC, supra note 81, at 6.
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But the Safety Valve approach to exceptions differs in the justifications
for the exceptions and the way they are invoked. Under the Safety Valve
Paradigm, exceptions are about ensuring that the international legal
regime’s ambitions are appropriately modest. The mantra is that the perfect
should not be the enemy of the good. Under the Policy Space Paradigm, by
contrast, exceptions do not create a second-best outcome. Instead, they
create a first-best world by allowing states to pursue other public policy
objectives.
Despite the difference in these approaches, in practice trade dispute
resolution panels have taken a narrow view of the ability of exceptions to
justify policy goals related to economic protection. As a result, the Safety
Valve approach is applied narrowly by tribunals, limiting the usefulness of
exceptions in promoting adherence to international trade rules. The Policy
Space Paradigm is applied more widely. As I have explained, though, its
focus on distinct policy domains effectively denies the use of exceptions to
legitimize measures that have mixed motives. Given the prevalence of
mixed motives in the real world and the pressure that the resulting measures
put on trade agreements, it is time for a new paradigm.
III. THE CHANNELING PARADIGM
The Policy Space Paradigm focuses on the relationship between issue
areas and legal regimes. The Safety Valve Paradigm focuses on the efficacy
of the primary legal regime. Both of these paradigms, though, ignore how
exceptions rewire domestic policymaking to produce mixed motive
policies. Instead, practitioners operating in both of these paradigms assume
that policies that deviate from trade’s primary rules should do so for a single
purpose. Moreover, practitioners in both paradigms seek to limit the extent
of economic protection that exceptions can justify. As a result, WTO law
on exceptions is ill-suited to the contemporary challenges facing trade law.
I therefore introduce the Channeling Paradigm. The intuition behind the
Channeling Paradigm is that a certain amount of domestic political pressure
for protection from foreign economic activity will remain in any political
system. That pressure will seek an outlet, which exceptions provide. Those
interested in increasing barriers to foreign economic activity will therefore
seek to form political coalitions in favor of policies that both create
protection and serve some other objective authorized by the exception. The
availability of international legal exceptions, in other words, channels
domestic political pressure for otherwise impermissible objectives into
policies that plausibly fit within the exceptions. As a result, “exceptional”
trade cases are very likely to involve government policies that have mixed
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motives. A trade jurisprudence that does not have greater tolerance for
governments’ mixed motives is one for which governments themselves are
likely to have little tolerance.
This Part sets out the descriptive underpinnings of the Channeling
Paradigm, while Part IV examines the doctrinal implications. Section A
explains how the availability of international legal exceptions influences the
design of domestic policies. Political science research has examined how
domestic politics influence states’ international behavior, while another
strand of research has looked at how international legal regimes constrain
domestic politics. International legal exceptions play an important, but
overlooked, role in this dynamic. By authorizing domestic policies that fit
within the exception, international legal exceptions create incentives for
practices similar to logrolling or the use of riders in legislatures. Policies are
designed to appeal to multiple constituencies to improve their chances of
both passage at the domestic level and being upheld as legal internationally.
Sections B and C examine the effects of this dynamic. I focus on two.
First, exceptions promote coalitions between advocates for policies that are
disfavored under international trade law. In many cases, those will be
groups wishing protection from competition and groups advocating traderestrictive measures in order to pursue a public good, such as environmental
protection. Because policies supporting public goods are ones with diffuse
benefits but concentrated costs, advocates of restricting trade in the name of
public goods would likely need to ally with other interest groups in order to
generate sufficient political support. Protection-seeking interests offer a
natural alliance. By creating the incentives for such an alliance, exceptions
foster the pursuit of public goods via trade policy.
Second, and for the same reason, exceptions cases are likely to be ones
in which governments have mixed motives. They are both genuinely
pursuing a permitted public good, while at the same time also seeking to
protect their domestic economy. This fact, in turn, creates two dynamics that
are harmful to the integrity of the international trade system: it creates
incentives for governments to push the boundaries of how much protection
they can justify with an exception; and it strains the legitimacy of
international trade tribunals, like the WTO Appellate Body, which
ultimately must pass on the legality of measures emerging from domestic
political coalitions within member states.
A. How International Law Channels Domestic Political Pressure
The basic idea behind the Channeling Paradigm is that exceptions
incentivize explicit or implicit bargaining among domestic interest groups.
Groups with different potentially trade-restrictive policy objectives, such as
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an environmental group and a domestic import-competing industry, will
unite around a single policy that plausibly fits within an exception. Such
policies will be more likely to be enacted domestically and stand a better
chance of an international tribunal finding that the measure falls within an
exception. At the same time, though, because they are products of multiple
policy objectives, “exceptional policies” are very likely to have mixed
motives.
Internationally, exceptions make it “cheaper” on the margins for states
to pursue policies that fall within the exception, as opposed to policies that
fall outside the exception. If an otherwise unlawful policy can fit within an
exception, then sanctions for violating international law are less likely.
Domestically, a lower likelihood of international legal sanctions reduces
opposition to the policy. Domestic political groups that favor policies that
fall outside of those permitted by international trade law would therefore
look to craft their policies to fit within the exception. In so doing, they would
often work with domestic political groups that favor policies that fall within
the core of the exception to craft a policy of which both groups approve. In
this way, the two groups generate domestic political support for their
favored policy, by simultaneously uniting their political support while also
reducing internal objections from trade lawyers and legal and diplomatic
pressure from other nations.
To unpack these ideas, I first explain how international legal exceptions
reduce the costs of policies that fall within the exception. I then explain how
those reduced costs alter bargaining over the design of domestic economic
policies.
1. How Exceptions Reduce the Risk of International Sanctions
Consider the point of view of a domestic industry that competes with
low-cost imports. To be concrete, think of the renewable energy sector in
the United States or the EU. The U.S. solar industry and the EU biodiesel
industry, for instance, have both sought protection from their governments
from cheap imports (primarily from China in the former case, and Argentina
and Indonesia in the latter case).164 That domestic industry would like to
impose barriers, such as tariffs or quotas, that raise the cost of imports and/or
limit their ability to enter the market.
164. Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector,
WTO Doc. WT/DS510/R (circulated June 27, 2019); Panel Report, European Union—Anti-Dumping
Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS480/R (adopted Feb. 28, 2018); Appellate
Body Report, Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/AB/R
(adopted Oct. 26 2016).
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Building political support for a measure reducing market access for
imports may not be easy, however. As standard trade theory demonstrates,
the losses to consumers within the protected market, who would have to pay
more to buy the protected product, will exceed the gains to domestic
producers.165 These economic losses will often translate into political
opposition to protection. To stick with our example, when the Trump
administration imposed safeguard tariffs on imports of solar panels into the
United States, the cost of installing solar panels in the United States
increased.166 This impacts end-use consumers, such as homeowners putting
solar panels on their roofs. Such consumers tend to be poorly organized,
meaning that they often are not able to mount successful political opposition
to protectionism that harms them.167 But the tariffs also impact other
workers in the supply chain, such as the companies that import, sell, and
install solar panels. Facing higher costs, these business groups will oppose
trade barriers. In the United States, the Solar Energy Industries Association
(SEIA) led the charge against the Trump administration’s solar tariffs,
arguing that the tariffs would cost thirty-one U.S. jobs in solar installations
for every job created in solar panel production.168
These directly affected domestic consumers—such as the SEIA and
homeowners with solar panel on their roofs—may not have enough political
clout to block protection. Enter international trade law. Violating WTO
rules creates costs for violating states and for constituencies within those
states. Where the state itself is concerned, those costs are reputational.169 If
a state (or, in practice, a government) fails to abide by its international
commitments, other states may be unwilling to enter into future agreements
with the violating state, or may demand better terms in order to do so.170
The Trump administration experienced this dynamic firsthand. Its use of
“national security” tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, as well as its
tariffs on Chinese imports, violate WTO rules in the view of most other
WTO members. President Trump talked as if these tariffs would give him
leverage to renegotiate U.S. trade relations with other countries. But while
he was able to negotiate the so-called “Phase 1” deal with China, as well as
165. See, e.g., Robert W. McGee, The Cost of Protectionism: Should the Law Favor Producers
or Consumers?, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 529, 555–56 (1993).
166. Alexander H. Schaefer & Frances P. Hadfield, Safeguard Tariffs Imposed by U.S. on Solar
Panels and Washing Machines are First Since 2002 Steel Import Restrictions, CROWELL MORING (Jan.
23, 2018), https://www.cmtradelaw.com/2018/01/safeguard-tariffs-imposed-by-u-s-on-solar-panelsand-washing-machines-are-first-since-2002-steel-import-restrictions/ [https://perma.cc/KJB3-PC23].
167. Cf. McGee, supra note 165, at 544.
168. SEIA, Study: Solar Tariffs Cause Devastating Harm to U.S. Market, Economy and Jobs
(Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.seia.org/news/solar-tariff-impacts [https://perma.cc/4P7M-A97N].
169. See GUZMAN, supra note 123, at 71–117 (describing a reputational theory of international
law).
170. Id. at 33–35.
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renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the actual
changes from the status quo contained in these agreements was quite
modest. One commentator, for instance, described the Phase 1 deal with
China as “simply restor[ing] the U.S.-China relationship to where it was
pre-President Donald Trump, [and declaring] victory in areas that don’t
matter.”171 Republican Senator Charles Grassley described the revised
NAFTA (the USMCA) as “95 percent . . . the same as NAFTA.”172 Given
the unlawfulness of the measures leading up to these negotiations,
commentators have wondered why other nations would rely on the Trump
administration’s commitments in any new agreements.173 The Trump
administration’s meager results from its negotiating strategy suggest that, in
fact, other nations did not put much faith in its promises.
Beyond reputational sanctions, trade agreements create the possibility of
economic sanctions. These economic sanctions mobilize domestic
opposition within the violating country to the unlawful trade measures.
They provide a reason for exporters of one product—say, oranges—to
lobby against import protection for an unrelated product, such as solar
panels.174 In other words, trade law encourages the formation of coalitions
between importers and exporters to lobby for lower trade barriers.
Trade rules create this linkage in two ways. When negotiating trade
agreements, exporters in, say, the United States will urge the U.S.
government to drop import barriers so that U.S. trading partners, like the
EU, will drop trade barriers on U.S. exports. To take one recent example,
U.S. exporters of lobster may urge the United States to reduce its tariffs on
European glassware and cigarette lighters, so that the EU will reduce its
tariffs on U.S. lobster.175
The same process works in reverse. If a country violates its trade
commitments with unlawfully high trade barriers, the WTO can authorize
171. Zachary Karabell, Opinion, The U.S.-China Trade Deal Was Not Even a Modest Win,
POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/01/17/united-stateschina-trade-deal-not-a-win-100533 [https://perma.cc/7HFB-FPLR].
172. Heather Long, Winners and Losers in the Final USMCA Deal, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/10/winners-losers-final-usmca-deal/
[https://perma.cc/8HT5-MCM6].
173. See, e.g., Simon Lester (@snlester), TWITTER (Apr. 4, 2019, 4:41 PM),
https://twitter.com/snlester/status/1113919586771066880 [https://perma.cc/D5PK-H7X7] (“I’m not
sure why anyone thinks the USMCA side letter will provide a stronger deterrent than [GATT] Article
II.”).
174. See Joost Pauwelyn, New Trade Politics for the 21st Century, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 559, 559–
60 (2008).
175. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Rep., Joint Statement of the United States
and the European Union on a Tariff Agreement (Aug. 21, 2020), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2020/august/joint-statement-united-states-and-european-uniontariff-agreement [https://perma.cc/GE2R-KBB2].
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complaining members to increase their trade barriers on imports from the
violating country. The complaining countries will typically choose the
products on which they levy higher duties based on political considerations.
For instance, the WTO found that the EU had unlawfully subsidized Airbus,
the European airplane manufacturer. When the EU refused to remove the
subsidies, the United States received permission to retaliate against the EU.
The United States did so by imposing tariffs on EU aircraft, but also on
food, wine, and spirits. The United States targeted the latter group of
products in a bid to hurt politically sensitive export industries that might
lobby the EU to remove its subsidies for Airbus.176
International trade law thus operates as a kind of force multiplier. It
provides domestic export-oriented interests an incentive to make a political
common cause with domestic consumers that pay an economic price for
their own government’s trade barriers. Trade law violations, such as
unlawfully high tariffs or discriminatory domestic regulations, influence
and encourage domestic political pressure. The system is designed to work
that way.177
The political economy of exceptionalism alters the way this dynamic
works. If the policy protecting the import-competing industry is designed to
fall within one of the WTO’s exceptions, then any violation of trade rules is
excused. The violation cannot be the basis for retaliation by other countries.
Nor would it be the basis for reputational sanctions. Exceptions are
bargained-for rights to deviate from legal rules. Exercising those bargainedfor rights would not cause governments to reassess the reliability of legal
promises made by other states.178
Invoking exceptions, in other words, neutralizes the force multiplier
effect that trade agreements have. Exporters have no reason to oppose
unlawfully high barriers on imports into their own country if those barriers
fall within the WTO’s exceptions, because other countries cannot legally
impose barriers to their exports in response. For instance, if the U.S. tariffs
on solar energy could be excused as safeguards under GATT XIX, or under
GATT article XX as measures related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources (in this case, the atmosphere), our hypothetical U.S.
orange exporters would no longer have a reason to oppose the solar panel
176. Andrea Shalal & David Shepardson, U.S. Leaves Tariffs on Airbus Aircraft Unchanged at
15%, REUTERS (Aug 12, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-eu/u-s-leavestariffs-on-airbus-aircraft-unchanged-at-15-idUSKCN2582WO [https://perma.cc/HRJ3-9FDR].
177. See Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2003).
178. Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 379, 394–95 (2010) (“A state that withdraws in accordance with an exit provision does so lawfully
and thus does not, in theory, suffer a reduction in its reputation for complying with international
agreements.”).
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tariffs. Domestic consumers are left as the only domestic political
opposition to import barriers.
Finally, exceptions can also reduce diplomatic pressure from foreign
governments. Governments, of course, can and do object to each other’s
perfectly lawful trade policies (which therefore do not implicate
reputational sanctions). Governments can convey these objections through
committees at the WTO, as well as through bilateral negotiations. But the
invocation of an exception in these less legalized contexts may mute the
pressure on the importing country to remove its barriers. Bargaining in the
shadow of a formal trade dispute, governments may back down from
aggressive complaints about policies that seem prima facie justifiable under
one of the WTO’s exceptions. The history of invocations of GATT article
XXI, the national security exception, are a testament to this dynamic.179
Governments have invoked GATT article XXI on several dozen occasions
since 1947, but only in the last several years have dispute panels been called
upon to adjudicate the exception’s meaning.180
2. Domestic Politics
From a political economy point of view, exceptions thus work to defang
opposition to protectionist policies. By providing a legal excuse for an
otherwise unlawful policy, exceptions reduce the domestic and international
opposition to protection. In so doing, exceptions create an incentive to try
to fit protectionist policies within exceptions. An otherwise unlawful policy
stands a greater chance of being adopted if it plausibly falls within an
exception. For this reason, exceptions can become important organizing
principles for those designing domestic policies. Put differently, exceptions
not only break up coalitions opposed to trade barriers; they also create
incentives for new coalitions to form to advance trade barriers. The result is
that “exceptional” policies are very likely to have mixed motives, a
permissible motive authorized by an exception and an impermissible one
that is not.
Consider three groups. First, take an organization that wants protection
from cheap imports, such as the U.S. solar panel manufacturers or U.S.
shrimpers. A simple tariff (or other trade barrier) on foreign imports may
not generate the political support necessary to overcome the objections of
consumers, export-oriented industries that face retaliation, and foreign
governments. For this reason, the U.S. solar or shrimping sector may seek
179.
180.

Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 12, app.
See id.; Saudi Arabia—IPR, supra note 120.
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to craft a policy that fits within an exception. Some exceptions, those most
closely associated with the Safety Valve Paradigm, focus on the protected
industry itself and thus may not require designing a policy that appeals to
other interest groups. In the United States, the Tariff Act of 1930 requires
the government to impose antidumping or countervailing duties if the
government concludes that unfair trade practices are injuring domestic
industry.181 Most exceptions, though, require a purpose unrelated to the
protected industry, such as the conservation of natural resources, the
protection of human life or safety, or national security. To fit within these
exceptions, protection-seeking industries will design policies that arguably
pursue these purposes.
In so doing, they often will support a policy that does not provide as
much protection as they would like. Instead, they design a policy that they
hope will attract more political support, delivering as much protection as is
politically feasible. For example, the U.S. shrimp or tuna industry may
support policies that limit imports that are captured in ways that harm sea
turtles or dolphins, respectively, in order to join their political support for
protection to the environmental community.182
Limiting imports to only those that are caught in ways that harm other
marine life will not limit imports as much as U.S. shrimpers or tuna
fisherman would like. But it makes the protection they do receive more
politically viable. Domestic politicians may be willing to endorse laws that
provide protection on environmental grounds, such as the Marine Mammal
Protection Act in the United States. That Act requires the government to ban
the import of commercial fish caught using methods that incidentally harm
marine mammals.183 Such laws can also be defended under GATT Art.
XX(g)’s exception for the conservation of natural resources, reducing the
likelihood of economic sanctions and the intensity of domestic and
diplomatic pushback.184
Our second group is the environmental community. Its calculus is
different. That community—or more generally the community interested in
any particular policy area, such as national security or public health—
wishes to build support for policies that advance its objectives. In today’s
181. Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 701–783, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1677.
182. United States—Shrimp, supra note 9; Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, No. DS21/R, 30 ILM 1594 (1991) [hereinafter United States—Tuna].
183. Marine Mammal Protection Act, § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (providing that the
government “shall ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which have been caught
with commercial fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of
ocean mammals in excess of United States standards”) [hereinafter MMPA]. See also Nat’l Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Ross, 331 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1344–45 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2018) (applying the MMPA to
ban fish caught in the waters of the endangered vaquita).
184. See, e.g., United States—Shrimp, supra note 9.
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globalized world, those policies will often have a trade component. The
business lobby in favor of low trade barriers is quite strong in the United
States.185 Every presidential administration in the United States since the
Truman administration has either pursued or completed a new trade
agreement.186 Public policies that address issues with widely diffuse
benefits, such as climate change, environmental protection, or public health,
may have trouble generating political support in the face of business groups’
opposition to trade barriers. Public interest groups may thus calculate that
policies that appeal to domestic business interests are more likely to pass.
Public interest groups, in other words, may look to craft policies that
benefit one set of economic interest groups in order to offset the opposition
from another set of economic interests. The environmental community and
the U.S. seafood industry have very different incentives in supporting an
import ban conditioned on environmental conditions. But the U.S. seafood
industry understands that the United States is more likely to enact and
sustain a ban on imports contingent on environmental policies than a
straight-up ban on imports. And the environmental community knows those
measures are more likely to pass when they enjoy support from a domestic
industry.187
The EU’s push for renewable energy provides another case in point. The
EU has issued a series of Renewable Energy Directives that seek to
decarbonize the European economy. For environmentalists, pushing
European industry to shift to renewable energy represents a win for the
climate and thus for European citizens (and, in fact, citizens globally). But
the EU explicitly justified its push for renewable energy in terms of both
environmental objectives and local economic development objectives.188
And when cheap imports of biodiesel began to undermine the EU biodiesel
industry, the industry pushed for protection.189 That protection first took the
form of antidumping duties. But when the WTO ruled that the European
antidumping duties did not fall within the WTO rules permitting such duties,
the EU switched to an environmental justification: palm oil-based biodiesel,
185. See
U.S.
CHAMBER
OF
COM.,
Trade
Works.
Tariffs
Don’t.,
https://action.uschamber.com/MYWsiem [https://perma.cc/DAR5-RYDD].
186. Arguably, the Trump Administration’s trade agreements, notably USMCA, actually raised
trade barriers, rather than lowered them. Every other administration lowered trade barriers or sought to
do so.
187. See Bruce Yandle, Viewpoint, Bootleggers and Baptists—the Education of a Regulatory
Economist, 7 REGUL., May/June 1983, at 12, 13–14.
188. Council Directive 2009/28, pmbl. (4), 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16, 16 (EC) (“When favouring the
development of the market for renewable energy sources, it is necessary to take into account the positive
impact on regional and local development opportunities, export prospects, social cohesion and
employment opportunities . . . .”).
189. See generally Crowley & Hillman, supra note 149; Fischer & Meyer, supra note 29.
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which happens to be from Indonesia and Malaysia, is produced in ways that
lead to unacceptable levels of deforestation.190 Now the EU faces a WTO
challenge to its environmental ban on palm oil-based biodiesel, one that will
likely end up turning on the application of GATT article XX(g)’s exception
for measures related to the conservation of natural resources.191
The design of a policy to satisfy both members of an “exceptional”
coalition can, of course, involve explicit negotiations between
representatives of the two groups. Such negotiations could occur directly,
or within a legislative or administrative body in which government officials
represent the interests of the two groups. But the support does not
necessarily have to take the form of explicit negotiations. The industry
might, instead, simply choose to support the group pushing the public policy
while remaining outside the limelight. Support of this kind could include
financial support for nonprofit groups or to fund litigation, or behindclosed-doors lobbying in support of the policy. These kinds of
nontransparent support may actually be more effective, as they avoid
drawing attention to the role of import-competing industries in what might
be called “greenwashing” their policies.192
Policies may also be designed to appeal to multiple constituencies even
without explicit negotiations between the two groups. Government officials
may act entrepneurially to design policies with widespread appeal.
Litigation can also be used to shape policies. For example, waste tires from
automobiles are an environmental and public health risk, in part because
they serve as a breeding ground for malarial mosquitos. In order to cut down
on the number of waste tires, the Brazilian government issued regulations
blocking the import of foreign-sourced used and retreaded tires.193
The EU eventually challenged this policy, culminating in the Appellate
Body’s 2007 report rejecting Brazil’s public health defense.194 Prior to the
EU’s challenge, though, Brazilian retread manufacturers obtained domestic
court orders enjoining enforcement of the used tire import ban, while the

190. Fischer & Meyer, supra note 29, at 307–12.
191. Request for Consultations by Indonesia, European Union—Certain Measures Concerning
Palm Oil and Oil Palm Crop-Based Biofuels, WTO Doc. WT/DS593/1 (Dec. 16, 2019); Request for
Consultations by Malaysia, European Union and Certain Member States—Certain Measures
Concerning Palm Oil and Oil Palm Crop-Based Biofuels, WTO Doc. WT/DS600/1 (Jan. 19, 2021).
192. See, e.g., Hajin Kim, An Argument for WTO Oversight of Ecolabels, 33 STAN. ENV’T L.J.
421, 425 & n.12 (2014) (noting that greenwashing can involve deceit but can also involve win-win
situations for industry and the environment).
193. See Brazil—Tyres, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
194. The Appellate Body found that Brazil’s measure was “necessary” to protect human life and
health, but found the court-ordered exception for used tires constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination in violation of the chapeau of GATT article XX. Id. ¶¶ 182–83, ¶¶ 246–47.
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embargo on finished foreign retreads remained.195 As a result, domestic
producers of retreaded tires were able to rely on a steady supply of cheap,
foreign used tires to refurbish and resell.196 They were also protected from
competition from foreign producers of retreaded tires. The result was a
mixed-motive measure, one that advanced Brazil’s public health aims by
reducing the number of imported tires, but also protected Brazil’s domestic
producers of retreaded tires. In a decision consistent with the Policy Space
Paradigm, the Appellate Body found the latter motive unjustifiably
discriminatory.197
That brings us to our third group: government lawyers. By appealing to
government lawyers, exceptions can neutralize internal governmental
opposition to protectionist policies. International trade, like virtually every
other area of international relations, has become increasingly legalized in
recent decades.198 Commentators often describe the formation of the WTO
and the creation of the Dispute Settlement Body as part of the
“juridification” of international trade.199 Lawyers and the logic of law have
replaced diplomats and the methods of diplomacy as a means of addressing
disputes. But government lawyers do far more than defend domestic
policies before domestic courts and international tribunals. They also review
domestic policies before they are ever implemented. Their concerns with
the legality of a particular policy under international law can result in the
policy being quashed.200 Moreover, government lawyers are often prone to
excessive caution. They may advise against policies that are plausibly legal
in order to avoid legal risks.
The availability of exceptions makes it easier to persuade government
officials generally, and lawyers in particular, not to oppose a policy during
internal government deliberations. Exceptions reduce the risks that
195. See Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶¶ 7.300–7.303,
WTO Doc. WT/DS332/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007); see also Tamar Megiddo, Beyond Fragmentation:
On International Law’s Integrationist Forces, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 115, 134–36 (2019).
196. The panel found that the injunctions undermined the policy aims of the regulations to such a
degree that it declared the regime to be unjustifiably discriminatory. Panel Report, Brazil—Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, supra note 195, ¶¶ 4.108, 7.306.
197. Brazil—Tyres, supra note 10, ¶ 247.
198. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11 122–201 (2012) (discussing the influence of lawyers within the intelligence and military
agencies); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421 (2000).
199. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the
Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 192 (2001);
WILLIAM J. DAVEY, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE RULES AND
EXCEPTIONS (2012).
200. GOLDSMITH, supra note 198, at 167–72. This is especially true if the policy originates
elsewhere in the executive branch.
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government lawyers are trained to spot and minimize. But the possibility of
using an exception also gives lawyers a basis to help craft a policy. Instead
of arguing that a policy will be unlawful, government lawyers can suggest
modifications to the policy that make successful invocation of an exception
more likely. In this way, exceptions engage legal expertise in support of
getting to “yes” within internal deliberations.
Government lawyers’ use of exceptions to craft and justify policy
internally was on display during the Trump administration. In 2017,
President Trump reportedly held a meeting with his top advisers, including
his new chief of staff John Kelly, in which he told Kelly to “[b]ring me some
tariffs!”201 Despite President Trump’s wishes, though, many of his advisers
opposed large tariff increases.202
Government officials resolved this impasse between President Trump
and his advisers by marrying the President’s protectionist inclinations to a
legal exception for national security measures. In April 2017, President
Trump directed Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross to begin an investigation
into whether imports of steel threatened the national security of the United
States.203 That report proceeded under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act, the domestic counterpart to GATT article XXI, allowing the president
to raise trade barriers in response to national security concerns.204 President
Trump made clear in his public remarks that his concerns were about
protecting the steel industry and steel workers’ jobs, not classic national
security concerns. For instance, in a 2018 visit to Granite City, Missouri, he
said, “Thanks to our tariffs, idle factories throughout our nation are roaring
back to life.”205
Ultimately, the Commerce Department’s ability to identify national
security as a legally available basis for the tariffs paved the way for the tariff
hawks in the Trump administration to prevail. The Commerce Department
produced a report concluding that “[t]he displacement of domestic steel by
201. Jonathan Swan, Exclusive: Trump Vents in Oval Office, “I want Tariffs. Bring Me Some
Tariffs!”, AXIOS (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.axios.com/exclusive-trump-vents-in-oval-office-i-wanttariffs-bring-me-some-tariffs-1513305111-5cba21a2-6438-429a-9377-30f6c4cf2e9e.html
[https://perma.cc/PTU6-GFBW].
202. Id.
203. Memorandum on Steel Imports and Threats to National Security, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOCS. 259, at 1 (Apr. 20, 2017).
204. See Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1115–21
(2020) (describing the domestic legal framework allowing the President to raise trade barriers for
national security reasons); J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic
Order, 129 YALE L.J. 1020, 1093–96 (2020) (discussing the expansion of national security as a
framework for governing international economic issues).
205. Jacob Barker, President Trump Touts Tariffs at Granite City Steel Plant, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (July 27, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/president-trump-touts-tariffs-atgranite-city-steel-plant/article_064757ce-044e-5fec-bd00-5f1eb5a1be5c.html [https://perma.cc/HGN2MDTB].
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imports has the serious effect of placing the United States at risk of being
unable [to] meet national security requirements.”206 National security
exceptionalism thus became the legal justification for tariffs that had little
to do with conventional national security concerns.207 Instead, legal
exceptions shaped the process and justification for otherwise unlawful
protectionist measures.
*

*

*

In sum, the Channeling Paradigm suggests that exceptions will act like
magnets, attracting the exact kind of protection-seeking impulses that
international economic law’s general rules are designed to constrain. As a
result, governments’ “exceptional” policies are not likely to resemble the
idealized measures envisioned by the Policy Space Paradigm in particular.
Instead, measures are likely to meld permissible and protectionist objectives
in a single measure in order to improve the overall measure’s political
viability. The existence of exceptions drives the creation of mixed-motive
measures.
The WTO’s list of major exceptions cases, many of which I have referred
to above, provides the empirical basis for this claim. United States—Shrimp
and United States—Tuna both involved environmental laws to protect
marine life (sea turtles and dolphins, respectively) but that also benefitted
from domestic support from the U.S. fishing industry. Brazilian courts
refined the public health measure at issue in Brazil—Tyres, as discussed
above, to make it friendlier to domestic producers seeking protection. In
EU—Seals, the Appellate Body found the EU’s ban on seal products
inconsistent with GATT article XX’s exception for public morals because
the measure explicitly tried to pursue multiple objectives—protecting seals,
206. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON
NATIONAL SECURITY 57 (2018), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/steel/2224-theeffect-of-imports-of-steel-on-the-national-security-with-redactions-20180111/file
[https://perma.cc/VS5L-WTSS]. Commerce made a similar finding for imports of aluminum. See U.S.
DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM ON THE
NATIONAL SECURITY 5 (2018), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/aluminum/2223-theeffect-of-imports-of-aluminum-on-the-national-security-with-redactions-20180117/file
[https://perma.cc/UN4M-BY4G].
207. The United States has also invoked GATT article XXI, the GATT’s national security
exception, in defense of its tariffs on steel and aluminum in WTO cases. The thrust of the U.S. argument
is that the national security exception is self-judging, meaning that a WTO panel cannot overturn the
United States’ own determination that its national security interests are at stake, and thus the exception
applies. See, e.g., U.S. Third-Party Submission, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 2,
WT/DS512
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.3d.Pty.Sub.Re.GATT.XXI.fin.%28public%29.p
df [https://perma.cc/BM9R-RRH6]. Those cases are still pending as of the time of writing.
THE

2022]

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WTO EXCEPTIONS

1345

permitting indigenous seal hunts, and allowing sustainable culling of seal
herds—in a way that, in the Appellate Body’s view, produced arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination. India—Solar Cells rejected a GATT article XX
defense aimed at shielding subsidies for renewable energy programs that
included local content requirements. And as discussed below, the United
States’ ban on flavored cigarettes ultimately fell due to an exemption for
domestically produced menthol cigarettes that emerged as a necessary
compromise during Congressional debates.208 In each of these instances, a
government policy justified under an exception to general WTO rules fell
because the policy pursued more than one objective, often a political
necessity to ensure the policy’s enactment.
B. How Trade Exceptionalism Promotes Public Policy
In this Section, I argue that, within limits, the fact that exceptions attract
protection is a feature, not a bug. The benefits of channeling flow from
diverting protectionist pressure that will always exist in society to serve the
public interest. Exceptions channel protectionists pressure into advocacy for
policies that fall within the scope of exceptions. If the substantive scope of
those exceptions is tied to important public policy values that are
underrepresented in the political process—prominent examples include
public goods like climate change or environmental protection—this
channeling effect can serve a beneficial purpose. By yoking inevitable
political pressure for protection to the pursuit of some other public goal,
exceptions in international trade law can promote the pursuit of important
“nontrade” values. Exceptions, in other words, act as the same kind of force
multiplier for general public policy considerations that the primary rules of
trade perform for trade liberalization—using reciprocal trade barriers as a
means to incentivize the formation of domestic political coalitions.
To see how exceptions promote the pursuit of underserved public policy
goals, notice that many of the public policy goals that are authorized by
WTO exceptions are public goods. GATT article XX(a) protects public
morals, which in practice states have invoked to protect animal welfare, a
public good. GATT article XX(b) protects public health measures, while
TRIPS articles 30 and 31 govern, in practice, compulsory licensing for
pharmaceuticals, a major public health issue in the age of COVID-19.
GATT article XX(g) involves the protection of natural resources. Even
national security, covered by GATT article XXI (as well as similar
exceptions in the GATS and TRIPS Agreement), is a public good, since
208. See infra Section IV.A. As I explain below, United States—Clove Cigarettes is functionally
an exceptions case, although as a strict doctrinal matter, it does not involve the invocation of a textual
exception.
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anyone living within a nation benefits from the nation’s efforts to protect its
citizens.
A public good is, by definition, nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.209
Nonexcludability is particularly important. It means that people get the
benefit of the public policy regardless of whether they pay the costs of the
policy.210 For instance, measures to address climate change, which would
be covered by GATT article XX(g), are public goods.211 The entire world
shares in the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions by the EU,
regardless of whether they pay the costs of reducing their own emissions.
Public health, covered by GATT article XX(b), is a similar kind of public
good. Vaccination can be costly to the vaccinated, especially if
pharmaceutical companies use their patent rights to charge exorbinant
prices. But vaccination reduces the risk that the unvaccinated will contract
the disease in question. Widespread vaccination against COVID-19, for
instance, will reduce the risk to those who do not have the vaccine.212
Public goods are traditionally undersupplied by governments.213 The
reason is that public goods impose concentrated costs but, because public
goods are nonexcludable, diffuse benefits available to many. Because those
footing the bill for a public good cannot consume all of the benefits for
which they pay, they will not pay for as much of the public good as would
be socially optimal.214 Moreover, because people can consume the good—
a safe climate, avoiding disease, protection from foreign threats—without
individually paying for it, they will often free ride. Public goods, in other
words, impose concentrated costs on those who provide the good, with
diffuse benefits that anyone can enjoy.
The traditional solution to this problem is to link the provision of public
goods with individual, excludable benefits.215 If access to an individual,
excludable benefit is tied to contributing to a public good, people would be
more willing to contribute to the public good. Taxes, for instance, solve this
problem for many government-provided goods, such as national defense.
Avoiding criminal prosecution for not paying taxes is a private benefit that
induces citizens to contribute to the public goods the government provides.
Market access via trade agreements is also a classic selective benefit that
the United States has linked to human rights and national security objectives
209. See Meyer, supra note 58, at 1972–74.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 2002.
212. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., VACCINES PROTECT YOUR COMMUNITY,
https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/work/protection [https://perma.cc/A6MW-3GPH].
213. Meyer, supra note 58, at 1969.
214. See id. at 1972–73.
215. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 51 (1965).
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abroad, both during the Cold War and the second Bush Administration’s
War on Terror.216
Just as market access—a reduction in trade barriers—can serve as an
excludable benefit internationally, the creation of trade barriers can serve as
an excludable benefit domestically. By permitting economic protection,
exceptions can thus provide domestic economic interest groups a reason to
lobby for public goods. Labor unions or domestic industries, for instance,
may become concerned with animal welfare or climate change in order to
secure protection from imports.
The organizational problem common to public goods that leads to
underrepresentation in the political process can also apply to other forms of
political failure. For instance, labor interests are frequently disadvantaged
in developed countries.217 In countries like the United States, the relative
weakness of labor interest groups, like unions, stems in part from legal
regimes that make organizing more difficult. But in part, it stems from the
fact that a decline in trade barriers has allowed companies to locate
production in countries with the lowest labor costs. This disadvantages labor
interests in negotiations with capital. More generally, the poor and working
class are often underrepresented in the political process.
Exceptional protection can solve this underrepresentation problem.
Protectionist groups can justify their policies if they take up the banner of
under- or unrepresented groups. This phenomenon is easy to see in
environmental cases. When U.S. shrimping or fishing interests lend their
support to import bans that protect sea turtles or dolphins, the unrepresented
wildlife find an unlikely champion.218 Likewise, the EU biodiesel industry
has favored protection that has denied the benefits of the EU’s incentives
for biofuels to products from countries that do not engage in sustainable
land-use practices.219 By arguing for measures that limit market access to
biodiesel produced through deforestation in countries like Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Argentina, the EU biodiesel industry may further climate
change and biodiversity objectives that often get short shrift in the political
process.
Indeed, the initial inclusion of labor and environment chapters in
preferential trade agreements owes much to this logic. The United States
216. See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 84, at 598, 604, 623–24 (discussing the foreign policy
paradigm of trade agreements).
217. See generally Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Workers of the World Divide: The Decline
of Labor and the Future of the Middle Class, FOREIGN AFFS. May/June 2012, at 88 (describing the rise
and fall of the labor movement in the United States).
218. See United States—Shrimp, supra note 9; United States—Tuna, supra note 182.
219. See Council Directive (EU) 2018/2001, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
December 2018 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources, arts. 6, 9, 13, 2018
O.J. (L 328) 82; Biodiesel from Indonesia, supra note 29; Biodiesel from Argentina, supra note 29.

1348

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 99:1299

first insisted on such chapters in NAFTA and has strengthened them in
subsequent agreements.220 The EU later began including similar
requirements in its agreements. Although the United States initially pushed
for these chapters to raise environmental and labor standards in Mexico for
the benefit of Mexican workers and citizens, a significant reason for the
higher standards was to make production in Mexico more expensive.221
Increased costs would reduce the movement of jobs to Mexico from the
United States, and thereby reduce imports into the United States from
Mexico. U.S. labor unions thus became champions for labor and
environmental rights in Mexico.
Channeling thus plays an important and welfare increasing role. To the
extent that exceptions are tied to underserved public policy goals,
exceptions redirect protectionist pressure into the service of those goals.222
Doing so scrambles the usual welfare calculus. The ordinary story is that
economic protection is inefficient and therefore welfare decreasing. Perhaps
for this reason, pre-WTO GATT panels in particular were leery of giving
broad scope to exceptions.223
But if economic protection results in the provision of public goods or
other underserved public policy goals, then the welfare calculus is more
complicated. If, for instance, local content requirements linked to renewable
energy programs result in greater public investment in a transition to a green
economy than would otherwise occur, the economic inefficiency created by
the local content requirement may be offset by future reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions.224 Likewise, any discrimination that may arise in
the EU’s carbon border adjustment would have economic consequences, but
the benefits from making the EU’s climate change regulations more
effective likely outweigh those economic costs. Buy American provisions,
if effectively designed to promote job growth among those segments of the
population who have lagged behind economically, could provide benefits to
communities and families that greatly exceed any economic inefficiencies
introduced into supply chains.
220. See Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 985, 1002–03 (2017).
221. See id.
222. The scope of exceptions are, of course, key to these benefits. Exceptions that are not linked
to underrepresented political groups are unlikely to generate the domestic political effects associated
with linking economic benefits to the pursuit of general public policy goals. For instance, the GATT
article XX(h) exception for measures undertaken to comply with commodities agreements, or XX(i)’s
exceptions for restrictions on exports as part of domestic stabilization plan, do not obviously relate to
underrepresented interests. Instead, they more plausibly are motivated by the Policy Space rationale.
223. See, e.g., United States—Tuna, supra note 182 (finding unlawful import restrictions on tuna
caught in a manner that risked harm to dolphins).
224. Meyer, supra note 58, at 1972–74.
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Although not commonly associated with exceptions, the benefits of
channeling are well known within the GATT/WTO. The traditional
understanding of the GATT/WTO rules is that they seek to ensure that all
protection “take[s] the form of tariff protection”225—a process known as
“tarrification.” Article XI bans all prohibitions or restrictions on both
imports and exports, other than duties, taxes, or other charges.226 Once
inside a country, imports “should be assimilated to domestic products and
be subjected to a regulatory regime identical to that applied to domestic
products.”227 Nondiscrimination guarantees this parity of treatment behind
the border.228 These rules forbid regulatory protection, while tariffs are
permitted within the limits established for each country in its tariff schedule.
The incentives to channel protection into tariffs is thought to create
benefits in the form of greater transparency229 and incentives for WTO
members to reduce their tariffs over time through reciprocal negotiations.230
But this account of the tarrification of protection tells only half the story.
Just as the GATT’s primary rules channel protection into tariffs, they also
leave the possibility of channeling protection into the exceptions. Because
the GATT’s primary rules close off regulatory protection, protection that
cannot easily be channeled into tariffs can still be channeled into exceptions.
Although the benefits of channeling protection into exceptions is different
from the benefit associated with channeling protection in tariffs—the
promotion of underserved public policy goals—they are no less important.
Nor, as I argue in Part IV, are they any less deserving of solicitude from
dispute resolution panels.
C. The Perils of Erosion
Channeling has significant benefits. The possibility of exceptional
protection rewires domestic politics in a way that can promote
underrepresented political interests. At the same time, channeling also
presents significant risks for the trading regime. Like water coursing
through a riverbed, channeling can result in erosion of the constraints
225. PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: A
COMMENTARY 128 (2005).
226. GATT, supra note 22, art. XI.1.
227. MAVROIDIS, supra note 225, at 128.
228. See GATT, supra note 22, art. III (providing for nondiscriminatory treatment between
imports and domestic products); see also id. art. I (providing for nondiscriminatory treatment between
imports of different countries).
229. See, e.g., Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy
Transparency, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 370–71 (2006) (noting that the effects of tariffs are
straightforward compared with other nontariff barriers).
230. See, e.g., Robert Pahre, Reactions and Reciprocity: Tariffs and Trade Liberalization from
1815 to 1914, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 467, 467 (1998).
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imposed by trade law. Seeking more room for protectionist policies,
governments may over time broaden the amount of room they seek for
protection. Doing so can undermine the balance of rights established by the
WTO Agreements and ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the trading
system as a whole.
The sudden importance of the WTO’s national security exceptions
illustrate the risk. Prior to 2017, no WTO panel had ever interpreted the
national security exception. Governments invoked the exception in
diplomatic disputes, but had shied away from putting it before a WTO panel.
Since 2017, though, national security has been invoked in five sets of
disputes. President Trump’s national security tariffs on steel and aluminum
are the most well known. However, Russia’s successful invocation of the
exception in a dispute with Ukraine,231 and Saudi Arabia’s partially
successful invocation of the exception in a dispute with Qatar232 have
actually produced the first two panel reports interpreting the exception.
Japan has also invoked the exception in a dispute with Korea, while the
United States has recently invoked the exception in a dispute with Hong
Kong.233
To some extent, the sudden use of the national security exception
represents an expansion of the concept of national security.234 But to a
significant extent, its more expansive use represents an erosion of the norm
of restraint. As Professor Pelc has described, WTO members have generally
exercised restraint in their use of exceptions in order to preserve both the
viability of the trade regime overall and to make the signal sent by invoking
an exception especially serious.235
The erosion of this restraint today is incontestable. Regardless of whether
the United States’ steel and aluminum tariffs meet the capacious definition
of national security contained in the U.S. domestic law purportedly
authorizing them, section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act,236 they almost
certainly are not responding to any “emergency in international relations”
as required by GATT art. XXI.237 Yet the steel industry, and government
231. Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 12.
232. Saudi Arabia—IPR, supra note 120.
233. Statements, supra note 5, at 11.
234. See Heath, supra note 204.
235. PELC, supra note 81.
236. See Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 806 F. App’x 982, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(rejecting the argument that section 232’s capacious definition of national security renders section 232
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 133.
237. The United States has thus far declined to say which specific subparagraph of Article XXI it
believes covers the steel and aluminum tariffs, although XXI(b)(iii) would appear most likely. See
Opening Statement of the United States of America at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, United
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officials in the Trump Administration with steel-industry ties (such as
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross), wanted to impose protection and thus
sought to fit concerns about overcapacity in global steel production into the
national security exception.238
Likewise, while the use and abuse of antidumping measures has long
been chronicled,239 countries have tried to use antidumping duties to
respond to an ever-broadening range of measures. The EU, as noted above,
has tried to apply antidumping duties to respond to upstream tax incentives
that have the effect of making domestic inputs cheaper.240 Such a
methodology might have broad application to nonmarket economies like
China. The EU, though, first tested the methodology in the market for
biofuels. Argentina and Indonesia imposed export taxes on crops used to
make biodiesel that exceeded the export taxes on finished biodiesel. As a
result, the crops became cheaper for biodiesel refiners in Argentina and
Indonesia to acquire. It is not clear that such measures qualify as subsidies
under the WTO agreements,241 so antidumping duties became the EU’s
preferred method of protecting its domestic producers of biofuels. But even
that approach required bending the antidumping rules beyond what they
plausibly say.242
While the erosion of restraint, especially as regards national security, is
undeniable, the extent of the risk from erosion is less clear. Commentators
have long expressed concern that any expansion of the amount of
“exceptional” protection puts the enterprise of trade liberalization in peril.243
In theory, of course, that is possible. But the lived experience of the
GATT/WTO has not been thus. That gradual liberalization that has
characterized the trade regime testifies to the fact that the current state of
trade law is not a necessary endpoint; it is only one potential spot on a
continuum.
States–Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, ¶ 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS556 (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/WTO/US.Pnl.Mtg1.Open.Stmt.%28As%20Delivered%
29.fin_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ4L-CU87].
238. Other WTO members have challenged the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs as inconsistent
with WTO rules and exceptions. See, e.g., id. ¶ 10. As of the time of writing, no panel has yet ruled in
those cases.
239. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, Temporary Trade Barriers Database Including the Global
Antidumping
Database,
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0039583
[https://perma.cc/4B7X-ESFJ].
240. See Biodiesel from Indonesia, supra note 29; Biodiesel from Argentina, supra note 29.
241. Crowley & Hillman, supra note 149, at 209–212.
242. Id.; Fischer & Meyer, supra note 29, at 301–06.
243. See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, Balance of Trade, HARV. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOV’T,
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/research-insights/policy-topics/development-economic-growth/balancetrade (quoting economist Dani Rodrik as saying “Twenty years ago . . . economists would tell me, ‘Do
you really want to say this in public—It will just feed the barbarians. Your arguments will be abused by
protectionists.’”).
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More to the point, though, the pushback against a greater role for
exceptions is the proximate cause of the current WTO crisis. The United
States paralyzed the WTO’s Appellate Body—and thus in a real sense the
possibility of mandatory binding dispute resolution for all WTO members,
since an appeal “into the void” blocks the adoption of a panel report—in
large part because it was unhappy with the Appellate Body’s narrow
interpretations of antidumping and countervailing duty rules.244
Arguing that the erosion of restraint represents the real threat to the WTO
thus involves a certain amount of myopia. To be sure, WTO members,
especially the United States, are pushing for more room to pursue
exceptional policies in ways that facilitate a domestic economic agenda that
sits in some tension with the early twenty-first century style of trade
liberalization. But doubling down on restraint has not shackled the
protectionist pressures. It has shifted them from relatively well-constrained
exceptions, like GATT article XX and antidumping rules, to claims of
national security exceptionalism. It has, in other words, caused these
pressures to shift from claims about how WTO exceptions should be
interpreted into an existential crisis for the institution.
The way forward, then, has to begin with an approach to exceptions that
acknowledges the political realities that underlie the trading system’s legal
exceptions. Governments are demanding a new approach with respect to
exceptions. Drawing on the insights of the Channeling Paradigm, the next
Part turns to describing what such an approach might look like.
IV. EXCEPTIONALISM AND MIXED MOTIVES
As I have suggested above and explain in further detail below, trade
panels have applied exceptions in ways that limit states to a single
permissible objective. In so doing, tribunals have overlooked the reality that
most state policies—especially those that invoke general exceptions—will
be mixed motive cases. Alternatively, tribunals may have overestimated the
extent to which states wish to use dispute resolution as a tool to constrain
protectionist elements that domestic politics will often inject into otherwise
permissible public policies.
Either approach to interpreting exceptions under WTO law is highly
problematic. On February 21, 2021, in the context of a dispute over labeling
exports from Hong Kong “Made in China,” the United States made clear
that it will continue to press a broader scope for action under the GATT’s
244. Jeffrey Kucik & Sergio Puig, Extending Trade Law Precedent, 54 VAND. J. TRANS’L L. 539,
571 (2021).

2022]

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WTO EXCEPTIONS

1353

national security exception.245 This stance throws cold water on the notion
that the Biden administration might change from the Trump
administration’s view on exceptionalism at the WTO.246 With cases
challenging the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive, and likely challenges to
any carbon border adjustment the EU or the United States might apply, as
well as possible cases stemming from emergency COVID measures,
reinforcing the cramped notion of WTO exceptions seems a recipe for
further instability in the multilateral trading system.
Trade law thus needs to rebalance its approach to exceptions. A new
approach must recognize the need to constrain blatant attempts at
protection, while also recognizing the fact that state policies that pursue
legitimate regulatory objectives are likely to suffer from mixed motives in
at least some degree. As the Channeling Paradigm suggests, allowing and
even encouraging states to pursue those legitimate objectives requires
greater tolerance for secondary motives that would be impermissible
standing alone.
To that end, this Part proposes two changes in how trade law deals with
exceptions: (1) a shift in how trade dispute panels approach mixed motive
cases, and (2) revising the language of exceptions in new trade agreements.
The goal of both reforms is to allow states the freedom to pursue mixed
motive policies so long as the predominant motive is a permissible one.
A. Handling Mixed Motive in Trade Law Cases
In this Section, I argue that future WTO tribunals should adopt a
“predominant motive” test for general public policy exceptions, such as
those contained in GATT article XX and GATS article XIV. Panels should
uphold the invocation of an exception motivated by a legitimate regulatory
interest so long as the legitimate regulatory interest is the predominant
motive. An impermissible objective would only be fatal to the invocation of
an exception if the impermissible objective were the predominant motive.
1. Justifying a Predominant Motive Test
Mixed motive cases are common across the law, arising in areas as
diverse as free speech, employment law, securities regulation, and tax.247
245. See Statements, supra note 5, at 11 (“The WTO cannot, consistent with Article XXI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, consider those claims or make the requested findings.”).
246. At the same time, the United States indicated that it is not prepared to revisit the appointment
of Appellate Body members, an issue that emerged over the interpretation of Safety Valve exceptions
like antidumping duties. See id. at 12.
247. See Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106 (2018)
(documenting the areas of the law that have mixed motive jurisprudence).
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The basic issue in these areas, as in international trade law, is how to analyze
the legality of a measure that has two motives, one permissible and another
impermissible. When does the impermissible motive so infect the
permissible motive as to render the measure unlawful?
Happily, trade panels need not start from scratch. Courts and tribunals
have applied a myriad of tests to answer this question.248 Which test is
appropriate depends on the context and the purposes of the rules in question.
Professor Andrew Verstein has identified four tests that are most common:
the Predominant Motive test, the But-For Motive test, the Sole Motive test,
and the Any Motive test.249 Under the Predominant Motive test, a
challenged measure is only unlawful if the impermissible motive is the
primary one. If the permissible motive is predominant, the measure survives
despite the existence of an additional, impermissible motive.250
Under the But-For Motive test, a challenged measure is only unlawful if
the impermissible motive is a “but-for” cause of the measure’s enactment.
In other words, if the government would have enacted the measure even in
the absence of the impermissible motive, then the measure is lawful.251
Under the Sole Motive test, a measure survives unless the impermissible
purpose was the only motive for the measure.252 Intuitively, under the Any
Motive test, the measure is struck down if there is any impermissible
motive. In other words, the challenged measure must be entirely free from
impermissible motives.253
A Predominant Motive test most closely aligns with the purposes of
general public policy exceptions. Most telling is the fact that, unlike in many
areas of the law in which mixed motives present themselves, we are here
dealing with exceptions.254 Public policy exceptions only arise in cases in
which a tribunal has already found that a measure violates the primary rules.
The entire purpose of an exception is thus to allow some measure of
otherwise unlawful conduct to persist.
The context and preamble of the GATT in 1947 and the WTO Agreement
in 1995 further make clear that member states did not mean to eliminate the
possibility of pursuing objectives in ways that are at odds with the primary
248. Id. app. B (cataloguing motive standards by legal domain).
249. Id. at 1134–43.
250. Id. at 1134–36.
251. Id. at 1137–38
252. Id. at 1139–41.
253. Id. at 1141–43.
254. For purposes of this Part, I put aside carveouts, exemptions, and scope provisions that are,
while functionally exceptions in the broad sense, are not exceptions in the sense of first requiring a
showing of a violation. Having said that, insights from the approach I outline here are relevant to
implementing limitations (such as temporal limitations) found in such provisions as well.
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rules of the trading system. The GATT 1947, for instance, began by noting
that international trading relations “should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods.”255 To this, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization added sustainable development, environmental
protection, and preservation.256 The negotiating history of the exceptions
further underlines the multiplicity of objectives member states had in mind.
This negotiating history is most clear in regards to GATT article XXI, the
national security exception. As Professor Pinchis-Paulson makes clear, U.S.
GATT negotiatiors “did not seek to make exceptions that would create an
open-ended, unchecked power” for member states to deviate from trade
rules.257 At the same time, negotiators “sought to prioritize U.S. national
security [over trade policy considerations] in drafting the security
exceptions.”258
In short, exceptions exist in trade agreements not just to create policy
space but to allow states to prioritize other objectives. A panel’s review of
an exceptions claim thus necessarily involves balancing the rights of
members under the WTO agreements with the unilateral rights of the
defendant state to pursue its other objectives.259 In balancing those interests,
though, panels cannot be blind to the way in which states actually make
policy. Government policies are rarely, if ever, the product of a single mind
or a single purpose. As the Channeling Paradigm suggests, policies are the
product of compromises among a range of interests with varying aims.
Member states are, of course, aware of how their own political processes
work. Thus, in excusing violations of trade rules for certain purposes, it
stands to reason that states understood that they would have a margin of
appreciation to pursue those objectives through the ordinary, messy,
political process. Peer review by other members and ultimately dispute
resolution would guard against abuses of the exceptions, but ordinary
255. GATT, supra note 22, pmbl.
256. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994,
1864 U.N.T.S. 154, (“allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment . . . .”).
257. Pinchis-Paulsen, supra note 100, at 118.
258. Id. at 117.
259. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 174, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 24, 2012) [hereinafter
United States—Clove Cigarettes] (“[T]he object and purpose of the TBT Agreement is to strike a balance
between, on the one hand, the objective of trade liberalization and, on the other hand, Members’ right to
regulate.”); United States—Shrimp, supra note 9, ¶ 159 (“The task of interpreting and applying the
chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between
the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members
under varying substantive provisions . . . .”).
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political bargaining should not constitute an abuse. A Predominant Motive
test best captures this aim. It allows states to engage in ordinary politics,
while also constraining efforts to completely hijack the use of exceptions
for ulterior motives.
In so doing, a Predominant Motive test would address some of the
legitimacy challenges that the Appellate Body and trade dispute resolution
have continued to face. The number of major challenges coming down the
pike that are likely to turn on exceptions is significant, including the U.S.
invocation of the national security exception in response to the Chinese
efforts to suppress democracy in Hong Kong and the likely reliance on
GATT article XX to justify the EU’s 2018 Renewable Energy Directive and
its forthcoming carbon border adjustment. These cases are likely to hit at a
time when WTO dispute resolution’s legitimacy remains fragile, in light of
the ongoing U.S. insistence on reform to the Appellate Body. Stiff reliance
on the Policy Space Paradigm, with its insistence on single motive
measures, would make the road back to a functioning dispute settlement
system difficult indeed.
2. The WTO’s But-For and Any Motive Tests
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body’s existing case law ignores these
realities. Like other areas of the law in which mixed motive cases appear,
the Appellate Body’s doctrinal approach is not always clear nor consistent
with prior applications. However, the Appellate Body’s various approaches
often resemble an Any Motive test. Such a test is consistent with the Policy
Space Paradigm, in which any trade restrictiveness must be in the service of
a permissible objective. Any trade restrictiveness stemming from an
impermissible objective renders the exception inapplicable.
To see the inflexible approach in existing WTO case law, notice that a
WTO member’s regulatory objective is irrelevant to evaluating whether a
violation of the WTO’s primary rules exists in the first place. WTO tribunals
evaluate a challenged measure as a trade measure under the WTO’s primary
rules. They then evaluate the challenged measure as a public policy measure
under the exceptions, looking to see if there is evidence of trade
restrictiveness unrelated to the claimed objective.
For a time, it looked like WTO tribunals might abandon this stark
division between the economic and public policy aspects of a challenge
measure. In the Dominican—Cigarettes case, the Appellate Body wrote that
a detrimental impact on imports might be “explained by factors or
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circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product . . . .”260 In other
words, a measure might not unlawfully discriminate if differences in
treatment could be explained by a legitimate regulatory purpose.261
In later cases, however, the Appellate Body abandoned this approach for
nondiscrimination cases under the GATT, holding that discrimination exists
when like products are not accorded equal competitive opportunities.262
Regulatory purpose thus plays no role in evaluating a measure’s consistency
with the GATT. Regulatory purpose is only relevant to an exception
analysis. This complete absence of a role for regulatory purpose is akin to
an Any Motive test. Any protectionist element—defined with reference to
the provisions of the WTO agreements alleged to have been violated—is
too much.
Moving to exceptions, the picture is murkier, but the bottom line is
similar. A substantial line of cases hew to an Any Motive approach in
denying the application of exceptions. Start with nondiscrimination under
the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. The TBT Agreement
does not have an exceptions clause, so the Appellate Body has found that—
unlike for most other nondiscrimination provisions—regulatory purpose is
relevant under the TBT.263 The Appellate Body was explicit that this role
for regulatory purpose is akin to that played by an inquiry into legitimate
regulatory objectives, such as that conducted under GATT article XX.264
The Appellate Body made regulatory purpose relevant under the TBT
Agreement by adding an additional step to the analysis of whether treatment
is “less favorable,” and thus constitutes discriminatory treatment. Under the
ordinary nondiscrimination test, a panel finds treatment “less favorable”
when it finds that a measure operated to the detriment of the equality of
competitive opportunities.265 Under the TBT Agreement, however, such
detrimental impacts do not amount to a violation if a panel finds that the
“detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from legitimate
regulatory distinctions.”266 Although not formally an exception, this
additional requirement functionally operates as one. And by its express
terms, this test is an Any Motive test. Unless discriminatory treatment is
entirely explained by a legitimate objective, the measure is unlawful. In
other words, any indication of an illegitimate objective is enough to doom
260. Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the Importation and
Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ¶ 96, WTO Doc. WT/DS302/AB/R (adopted May 19, 2005).
261. See also Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an
“Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L LAW. 619 (1998).
262. EU—Seals, supra note 14, ¶¶ 5.105, 5.116.
263. United States—Clove Cigarettes, supra note 259, ¶ 174.
264. Id. ¶¶ 169–75.
265. EU—Seals, supra note 14, ¶ 5.108
266. United States—Clove Cigarettes, supra note 259, ¶ 174.
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a measure. The Appellate Body has directed panels to look for purity in how
states make policy.
This search for purity has significant negative consequences. United
States—Clove Cigarettes illustrates the problem.267 In the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, the U.S. Congress prohibited
the production or sale in the United States of flavored cigarettes, but allowed
the sale and production of menthol cigarettes.268 Indonesia challenged the
ban as discriminating among like products—clove cigarettes from
Indonesia and menthol cigarettes from the United States.269 As a matter of
legislative history in the United States, the exception for menthol cigarettes
appears to have been demanded by the Congressional Black Caucus on the
grounds that menthol cigarettes were popular with its constituents.270
Passing the broader health measure thus required weakening the measure
somewhat through a concession to a politically necessary group in
Congress.
This concession proved fatal at the WTO. Both the panel and the
Appellate Body ultimately found that section 907 discriminated against
Indonesian clove cigarettes in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement.271 Ignoring the domestic political process entirely, the panel and
the Appellate Body each concluded that menthol cigarettes and clove
cigarettes both appeal to youth and therefore could not be distinguished
based on the United States’ purpose of preventing youth smoking.272
The decision in Clove Cigarettes aims for Solomonic wisdom. Although
ultimately striking down the U.S. measure, the Appellate Body essentially
read the possibility of an exception directly into Article 2.1’s
nondiscrimination rule. The Appellate Body thus created the possibility of
a future claim in which distinctions based on regulatory purpose might
survive. On the other hand, by forcing any detrimental impact on imports to
stem from that distinction, the Appellate Body’s decision effectively
forecloses the possibility that mixed motive measures will survive. A
267. See id.
268. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A).
269. Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of Indonesia, Annex A-1, United
States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶¶ 14–15, WTO Doc.
WT/DS406/R, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/406r_a_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MBXGDRX].
270. Matthew Bigg, U.S. Tobacco Bill Puts Focus on Menthol Cigarettes, REUTERS (June 17,
2009, 3:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tobacco-congress-menthol/u-s-tobacco-bill-putsfocus-on-menthol-cigarettes-idUSTRE55G6RA20090618 [https://perma.cc/ABU2-4HJA].
271. United States—Clove Cigarettes, supra note 259, ¶ 298(a); Panel Report, United States—
Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 8.1(b), WTO Doc. WT/DS406/R
(adopted Apr. 24, 2012).
272. United States—Clove Cigarettes, supra note 259, ¶ 225.
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measure that is the product of both public policy and protectionist forces
would, almost by definition, never create detrimental impacts that stem
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.273 Rather, the
detrimental impact will almost certainly stem at least in part from the desire
to protect some domestic industry.
The difficulty with this approach is twofold. First, in Clove Cigarettes,
the domestic political process in the United States was trying to protect
menthol cigarettes from generally applicable domestic regulation, not from
competition with clove cigarettes. Even with respect to youth smoking,
Indonesia submitted that 1.1 million out of approximately 2.5 million youth
smokers regularly smoked menthol cigarettes, while only 6,800 regularly
smoked clove cigarettes.274 This data is damaging to the U.S. argument
about regulatory purpose, showing that the United States continued to allow
youth access to a preferred cigarette. But it also suggests strongly that the
United States was not animated by the purpose of discriminating against
Indonesian cigarettes. They simply did not occupy a sufficient market share.
Second, these kinds of technical decisions that ignore the political
realities in WTO member states create the risk of a backlash. Important
constituencies within member states may not see the value in complying
with the institution’s rules if those rules require a politics free of
compromise. As Tomer Broude and Philip Levy argued in the context of
this case, a consideration of regulatory purpose is virtually unavoidable in
nondiscrimination cases.275 But divorcing that consideration from the
context in which national governments negotiate those purposes threatens
to render hollow member states’ ability to pursue those public policy
purposes.
Although the tests are more complicated, the picture is essentially the
same in the context of the explicit general exceptions in GATT Article XX
and GATS Article XIV. As noted above, most WTO general exceptions
require that a measure be “necessary” to achieve a legitimate public policy.
WTO panels evaluate necessity in two steps. First, they ask whether the
contribution the measure makes to a legitimate regulatory objective
outweighs the measure’s “trade restrictiveness, in light of the importance of
the values at stake.”276 This approach resembles a Predominant Motive (or
more accurately, a Predominant Effect) test. Does the pursuit of the
legitimate objective outweigh the pursuit of the illegitimate objective?
273. Id. ¶ 174.
274. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes, ¶ 7.390 n.708 WTO Doc. WT/DS406/R (adopted Apr. 24, 2012).
275. Tomer Broude & Philip I. Levy, Do You Mind If I Don’t Smoke? Products, Purpose and
Indeterminacy in US—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 13 WORLD
TRADE REV. 357, 361 (2014).
276. Brazil—Tyres, supra note 10, ¶ 156.
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Second, though, panels ask whether there are reasonably available
measures that make the same contribution to the regulatory objective but
are less trade restrictive.277 This element resembles an Any Motive test.
Although the Appellate Body has not articulated this requirement in terms
of intent, which remains technically irrelevant, in practice this test
invalidates any trade restrictiveness above the minimum required for the
state to achieve its objective. It denies, in other words, the state invoking the
exception the discretion to choose among possible measures that differ in
their trade restrictiveness.
Even where a measure is found “necessary” under this test, the chapeau
of Article XX requires that any discrimination the measure creates not be
arbitrary nor unjustifiable, and the measure must not constitute a disguised
restriction on trade.278 “[T]he relationship of the discrimination to the
objective of a measure is one of the most important factors” in assessing
whether a measure discriminates arbitrarily or unjustifiably.279 The
Appellate Body has said that “there is arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination . . . when a Member seeks to justify discrimination resulting
from the application of its measure by a rationale that bears no relationship
to the accomplishment of the [permissible] objective . . . .”280 This approach
is essentially the same as that under the TBT Agreement: any discrimination
must extend exclusively from a legitimate regulatory objective. Any
secondary motive is fatal.
3. A Predominant Motive Test for the WTO
A Predominant Motive test is thus more consistent with the object and
purpose of the WTO’s exceptions: balancing the government’s right to
regulate with the objectives of trade liberalization. Such a test would need
to make its way into WTO law in two ways: in evaluating the means-ends
relationship between a measure and its purpose, and in the
nondiscrimination element that the Appellate Body has read into the
chapeau of the WTO’s general exceptions.
Converting the “necessity” from an Any Motive test to a Predominant
Motive test is relatively straightforward. As discussed above, the
“necessity” test is a two-stage inquiry. First, the party invoking the
exception must show that the contribution the measure makes to its
objective outweighs the trade restrictiveness, in light of the importance of
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
GATT, supra note 22, art. XX.
EU—Seals, supra note 14, ¶ 5.321.
Brazil—Tyres, supra note 10, ¶ 246.
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the value at stake. Second, the party opposing the exception has the
opportunity to show that there are reasonably available, less trade-restrictive
alternatives. Simply eliminating that second step would convert the
“necessity” test into a Predominant Motive test—one that asks whether the
legitimate objective is the primary one that the measure pursues.
A similar shift in the nondiscrimination test would preserve the
chapeau’s function and be consistent with its object and purpose, while
granting states more room to engage in the normal bargaining that leads to
public policy. Instead of insisting that any discrimination be justified with
reference to the permissible policy objective, WTO panels should ask
whether the predominant reason for the discrimination is the pursuit of the
permissible objective. Such a shift would remain consistent with the text of
the chapeau, which offers no guidance as to how panels should evaluate
what constitutes “arbitrary” or “unjustifiable” discrimination.
Two objections to this approach are worth considering. The first is
evidentiary: how would a panel assess motive? WTO panels, however,
already have an approach that they use to evaluate the purpose of a measure
developed in the context of the GATT’s affirmative nondiscrimination
rules.281 That approach does not call for looking at the subjective intent of
government officials. Instead, it looks at the design, architecture, and
anticipated application of a measure as objective evidence of what the
government intended.282 Beyond the measure itself, evidence can include
information, such as studies about how a measure would apply, in the public
record prepared by the lawmaking body.283 WTO panels are, in other words,
already assessing government motives and could continue to do so in the
same manner. The change would be to the quantum of motive necessary to
doom a measure, not to how motive is evaluated from an evidentiary
standpoint.
Second, the scope of some WTO exceptions is potentially so broad that
those exceptions could conceivably come to swallow the rules. The national
security and public morals exceptions are perhaps the two most obvious
candidates. As I argued above, the risk that these exceptions will be broadly
invoked seems outweighed in the current moment by the risk that WTO
rules will unduly hamper efforts to address systemic societal risks such as
climate change or pandemics.284 Moreover, though, safeguards against
281. See supra note 31.
282. See Appellate Body Report, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 71, WTO Doc.
WT/DS110/AB/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2000).
283. Panel Reports, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R, ¶¶ 7.156-7.163 (adopted June 18, 2014)
(describing reports before the European Commission about the market impacts of the then-contemplated
ban on seal products).
284. See supra Section III.C.
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abuse remain in place. This concern about abuse goes to the permitted ends
of the exception, but a Predominant Motive test—an evaluation of the
means used to pursue those ends—would continue to rule out measures that
are primarily driven by impermissible motives. Politics and diplomacy also
remain an important check on overreach. The basic trade liberalizing
infrastructure has many beneficiaries that would stop measures that
wholesale destroyed those benefits before they were enacted. Finally, panels
could also take a narrower approach to interpreting the scope of broad
exceptions like public morals and national security. As panels have done in
the national security context, for instance, panels could require more than
simply a bare claim that national security or public morals is implicated,
inquiring instead into the provenance of the claimed interest or moral.285
These modifications would require changes in WTO case law. But these
changes should not be cause for heartburn among trade lawyers. Although
it was often not transparent in its precedential practices, the Appellate Body
not infrequently declined to follow its prior decisions.286 Moreover, the
Appellate Body’s technocratic adherence to and extension of precedent is a
major reason that the United States paralyzed the institution, a trend that the
Biden Administration has continued.287 Changes to WTO case law on
exceptions thus seem a critical part of restoring the Appellate Body (or
replacing it with a new mechanism). These changes would go a long way
toward that purpose.
B. Redesigning Exceptions Clauses
States continue to negotiate new trade agreements and therefore new
exceptions clauses. The Channeling Paradigm suggests that these new
clauses should reflect the reality that exceptional measures are likely to
pursue multiple objectives. Most general and security exceptions currently
in use were either drafted at the end of World War II or are based on
provisions that were. But the prevailing approach to trade agreements at that
time was one of embedded liberalism, which saw trade liberalization
coexisting with substantial discretion for states to pursue social policies at
home.288 With a trade dispute system that increasingly infringes on states’
285. See Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 12 (interpreting the national security exception in
the GATT); Panel Report, Saudi Arabia—IPR, supra note 120 (interpreting the national security
exception in the TRIPS Agreement).
286. See Kucik & Puig, supra note 244, at 561 tbl.2 (finding that the Appellate Body narrows or
distinguishes its precedent 13% of the time).
287. See Statements, supra note 5, at 12.
288. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982).
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ability to engage in normal policymaking through coalitional bargaining, as
the Channeling Paradigm explains, a new approach is necessary. To that
end, this Section analyzes shifts (or lack thereof) in the drafting of general
exceptions clauses and proposes textual changes to codify a Predominant
Motive test.
The main text of the GATT has resisted change since 1947. That lack of
change, though, obscures the expansion of exceptions into new areas of
trade and economic law. This should hardly come as a surprise. Beginning
in the 1980s, states have negotiated new trade agreements at a rapid clip.
The Uruguay Round closed in 1994 with an expansion of trade rules into
services (the GATS) and intellectual property (the TRIPS Agreement).
Preferential trade agreements have exploded. The United States, Canada,
and Mexico brought NAFTA into force in 1994, and a renegotiated version
came into force in 2020. Overall, the United States has preferential trade
agreements that cover trade with twenty nations.289 The EU has forty-four
preferential trade agreements covering trade with seventy-six nations.290
The EU and its trading partners concluded a number of these agreements in
the last five years. China reports sixteen preferential trade agreements
covering forty countries (although some countries are members of multiple
agreements).291
Each new trade agreement forces states to revisit the proper scope of
exceptions, and thus is an opportunity to revise and tinker with the language
in exceptions clauses. Some treaties have innovated in the use of exceptions,
especially to deal with particularly thorny issues. The Trans-Pacific
Partnership, as noted above, excepted tobacco control measures from the
agreement’s investor-state dispute settlement procedures.292
Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol between the UK and the EU
provides another example. Perhaps the most difficult issue associated with
the UK leaving the EU involved Northern Ireland. The Good Friday
Agreement, a key component of peace in Northern Ireland, requires the
absence of a “hard” border between Northern Ireland, which is part of the
UK, and the Republic of Ireland, which is an EU member state.293 When the
UK was also within the EU, this absence of a border presented few
289. Free Trade Agreements, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/KLM5-GPZP].
290. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Implementation of EU Trade
Agreements 1 January 2019 – 31 December 2019, at 4, COM (2020) 705 final (Nov. 12, 2020).
291. China FTA Network, China’s Free Trade Agreements, MINISTRY OF COM., PEOPLE’S REP.
OF CHINA, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta_qianshu.shtml [https://perma.cc/3VAE-UGTT].
292. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 113, art. 29.9.
293. Tom Edgington & Chris Morris, Brexit: What’s the Northern Ireland Protocol?, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-53724381 [https://perma.cc/84UB-6HGA].
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problems. Once the UK left, however, a separate agreement was necessary
to preserve the open border. That agreement, the Northern Ireland Protocol,
keeps an open border on the condition that a regulatory border be
established between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, in order to
keep Northern Ireland from serving as a backdoor from the UK into the
EU.294 Article 16 provides an exception to this open-border requirement,
though, for situations that cause “economic, societal or environmental
difficulties.” The EU has already invoked the exception to prevent COVID19 vaccines produced in the EU from making their way into the UK,
although it reversed its decision after a public outcry.295
Outside of these specialized contexts, though, states have been relatively
unambitious in how they have taken on treaty exceptions. For instance, the
general exceptions clause in the GATS, concluded in 1994, largely mirrors
the general exceptions clause in the GATT, concluded in 1947. Moreover,
the differences go to the permissible regulatory objectives themselves.296
The language regarding means-ends and nondiscrimination, which governs
the freedom states have to design measures that pursue multiple objectives,
is identical.297 Other agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round, such as
the TBT Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, do not include general exceptions at all.298
More recent WTO negotiations have doubled down on the GATT’s
approach, focusing on measures that are necessary and do not discriminate
arbitrarily or unjustifiably. In February 2021, the draft negotiating text of a
possible WTO agreement on e-commerce leaked.299 Member states had
made two suggestions regarding general exceptions. Both, though,
essentially incorporated the GATT’s general exceptions approach, either by
copying the text or by incorporating GATT Article XX by reference.300
Proposals for the national security exception similarly either copied the text
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Certain objectives that are relevant for goods are not relevant for services. Compare GATT
art. XX, with GATS art. XIV.
297. Id.
298. Arguably, GATT article XX could apply to these agreements, which are themselves derived
from some portion of the GATT. See Simon Lester, USTR’s View of GATT Exceptions in Relation to
Non-GATT Goods Agreements, INT’L ECON. LAW & POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 22, 2021, 5:17 PM),
https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2021/02/ustrs-view-of-gatt-exceptions-in-relation-to-non-gattagreements.html [https://perma.cc/94H7-6A3Y]. This position has not carried the day, although the
United States appears as if it may have tacitly adopted this view, at least in regards to the national security
exception, in a dispute regarding labeling exports from Hong Kong as “Made in China.” Id.
299. WORLD TRADE ORG., WTO ELECTRONIC COMMERCE NEGOTIATIONS, CONSOLIDATED
NEGOTIATING
TEXT–DECEMBER
2020
(2020),
https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/
wto_plurilateral_ecommerce_draft_consolidated_text.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV55-6BMX].
300. Id. at 85.
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of GATT Article XXI, adapting it to e-commerce rather than trade in goods,
or incorporated GATT Article XXI by reference.301 As relevant here, the
proposed exceptions would all reflect the GATT Article XX emphasis on
the impermissibility of mixed motives by incorporating the necessity test
and the nondiscrimination test developed under GATT Article XX.302
General and security exceptions have also made their way into
investment treaties. Professor Caroline Henckels found that 43 percent of
such agreements concluded between 2011 and 2016 included a general
exceptions provision, while only 7 percent concluded from 1959 to 2010
included an exceptions provision.303 These provisions “incorporate by
reference or are modelled on the general exceptions in Article XX of the
[GATT] and Article XIV of the [GATS] . . . .”304
An alternative approach within new trade agreements would borrow
from the experience of investment treaties. In response to decisions that they
perceived as overreaching, a number of states began including clarifications
in the investment chapters of their trade agreements and standalone
investment treaties. This language provides that “[n]on-discriminatory
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations . . . .”305
This language was adopted to clarify the meaning of rules prohibiting
expropriation, but other countries have adopted the means-ends
relationship—“designed and applied to”—to their general exceptions
clauses.306 Specifically, they have modeled the scope of their general
exceptions clauses on GATT Article XX, but replaced “necessity” with
“designed and applied to.” They have also retained the chapeau of Article
XX and its nondiscriminatory requirement.
This approach dramatically improves the workability of general
exceptions clauses. Unlike the necessity test, the “design and applied to”
standard does not preclude the possibility that a measure had more than one
motive. It merely requires that one purpose—as evidenced by the measure’s
301. Id. at 86.
302. More targeted exceptions within the agreement also adopted the necessity test. See Simon
Lester, Exceptions Proposals in the WTO E-Commerce Negotiating Text: Part 2, INT’L ECON. LAW &
POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 16, 2021, 7:54 PM), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2021/02/exceptions-proposal-inwto-e-commerce-negotiating-text-part-2.html [https://perma.cc/RW3U-XBNW].
303. Henckels, supra note 70, at 2826 (footnote omitted).
304. Id. at 2828.
305. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., Annex 9-B.3(b),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4K5-XZJQ]; see
also CETA, supra note 34, at Annex 8-A.
306. See, e.g., Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, art. 22.1, May
23,
2007,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/3092/download [https://perma.cc/JGN2-5LQS].
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design and application—is a permissible regulatory objective. The original
context of this language’s development further underlines this point. The
“designed and applied to” standard was created to provide defendant states
greater discretion in how they pursue legitimate regulatory objectives. This
negotiating history further makes clear to treaty interpreters that multiple
objectives should not be fatal to invoking an exception. By contrast, new
exceptions clauses that mirror or incorporate by reference existing WTO
exceptions risk codifying, in the eyes of future treaty interpreters, existing
WTO case law on exceptions.
To be sure, states have adopted the nondiscrimination requirement from
the chapeau of GATT Article XX even in those treaties that have discarded
the necessity test.307 In recent cases like EU—Seals and Brazil—Tyres, the
nondiscrimination requirement has been the stumbling block to successfully
invoking the exception. Modifying the language of GATT Article XX in
new agreements could make clear that a Predominant Motive test applies to
the nondiscrimination test in the chapeau as well. Currently, that language
provides that: “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade . . . .” The chapeau
could be rewritten to codify a Predominant Motive test in the following way:
“Subject to the requirement that arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail is not the predominant
objective of such measures . . . .” This language makes two changes. First,
it deletes the prohibition on “a disguised restriction on trade.” This language
suggests that tribunals should look for hidden motives, a requirement that
should be eliminated in favor of asking directly whether a legitimate
objective constitutes the challenged measure’s primary motive. As the
Channeling Paradigm suggests, multiple objectives are more likely the norm
in policy making. Giving tribunals license to root out motives they deem
“disguised” seems particularly unwise in the current context of fragility in
international dispute resolution.
Second, this language makes clear that arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination is only problematic if it is the predominant objective of
discrimination among countries where like conditions prevail. This
language preserves the fundamental nondiscrimination requirement of the
chapeau. At the same time, though, it expands the discretion states have to
choose among measures that might incidentally discriminate among
countries.
307.

See, e.g., id.
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In so doing, it will expand the margin of appreciation member states
enjoy from second guessing by dispute panels. Trade panels woul still be
able to strike down measures that are predominantly protectionist or
discriminatory. But mixed motive measures that predominantly pursue
permitted objectives will survive. That rebalancing between the right to
regulate and the objectives of trade liberalization would bolster the
legitimacy of trade law and its dispute settlement function at a time when
such legitimacy is sorely needed.
V. WHITHER PUBLIC POLICY WITHIN THE TRADE SYSTEM?
During most of the twentieth century, the United States treated
international trade policy primarily as an instrument of foreign policy.308
Trade liberalization helped rebuilding efforts after World War II and shored
up support for the United States during the Cold War. In this context, the
exceptions in international trade law primarily fit within the Policy Space
and Safety Valve Paradigms. Exceptions demarcated the boundaries
between different issue domains and created an outlet for domestic
protectionist pressures.
By the end of the Cold War, however, U.S. trade policy was less and less
moored to concrete foreign policy goals. To be sure, the George W. Bush
administration entered into a number of trade agreements with countries that
supported its war on terror, but those agreements were for the most part not
economically significant for the United States.309 Likewise, the Obama
administration cited concern about China as a foreign policy justification
for its Trans-Pacific Partnership.310 But most of the terms in the agreement
seemed to bear little relationship to this strategic concern.
Instead, trade agreements became increasingly about domestic economic
policy and rent seeking by domestic interests. The intellectual property
provisions of trade agreements offer one of the clearest examples.311 Efforts
to boost intellectual property rights overseas serve no foreign policy goal.
They are motivated by efforts to increase the economic returns to
multinational enterprises (usually U.S. based) that have business models
based on the development of innovative technologies and medicines.312
308. See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 84, at 598.
309. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oman-U.S., Jan. 19,
2006, Hein’s No. KAV 8673 [hereinafter Oman Agreement]; see also Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note
84, at 623.
310. See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 84, at 624.
311. See, e.g., Oman Agreement, supra note 309, art. 15.
312. Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law Through the
U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 980, 984 (2014).
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Likewise, efforts to boost regulatory harmonization promoted the economic
interests of transnational business communities, but did little to promote
foreign policy objectives.313 Even the reduction in tariffs achieved through
free trade agreements like NAFTA and the dramatic expansion of the WTO
in the decades after the end of the Cold War had significant domestic
economic effects. These agreements allowed multinational companies to
disaggregate their supply chains across countries, moving jobs offshore.
While the globalization of supply chains had beneficial effects for
companies, and led to job growth in some communities within the United
States, it also led to significant and long-lasting economic turmoil in
communities in which jobs were shipped offshore.314
Despite this tremendous shift in the international trade landscape,
however, the basic contours of trade agreements have been slow to change.
The WTO has been a particularly difficult ship to turn. While many
preferential trade agreements now at least include labor and environment
provisions, the WTO still has no renegotiated settlement between trade
liberalization interests and other public policy goals that may conflict with
trade liberalization. Instead, WTO agreements create room to pursue those
objectives through exceptions. It is thus critical that the interpretation of
those exceptions accurately reflect the underlying political pressures that
lead to their invocation.
Unfortunately, the WTO’s case law on exceptions is not up to the task.
Today, the United States and the EU worry about whether WTO rules
unduly constrain efforts to address domestic economic inequality that trade
liberalization has exacerbated. Many developed countries worry that
without aggressive action on climate change, in ways that are sure to be
challenged at the WTO, humanity faces an existential threat. Policies that
address these issues are sure to require the very kind of bargaining among
domestic interests that the Channeling Paradigm predicts will occur around
international legal exceptions.
Dispute panels and treaty negotiators must adapt to this reality. The hope,
shared by many, that Donald Trump’s departure from office would mark a
return to the status quo ante in the trading system is sure to be disappointed.
The EU is moving forward with imposing a carbon border adjustment

313. See, e.g., The Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement
arts. 6–7, Dec. 1, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 7886; Oman Agreement, supra note 309, arts. 6–7; Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493; TBT
Agreement, supra note 47.
314. David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor
Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2155–56 (2013).
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mechanism that will surely be challenged as discriminatory.315 Similarly,
President Biden has promised to impose a carbon border adjustment “fee,”
which, if imposed as a fee, would be even more difficult to justify.316 The
United States seems likely to demand continued flexibility in how it
responds to China and its highly interventionist economic model. And a
more egalitarian trade policy—whether under the guise of “Trade Policy for
All” or a “worker-centric” trade policy—remains central to how
governments conceive the purpose of trade policy.
While in theory solutions to these problems exist that do not violate trade
law’s primary rules, the Channeling Paradigm suggests that governments
are not likely to choose those options. Instead, the most practical solutions
to the pressing trade policy problems of the twenty-first century are likely
to be mixed motive policies. In this context, the Appellate Body’s growth
in recent years into a body that recognizes greater policy space for states to
discriminate in the pursuit of a public policy objective, so long as they are
not blatantly discriminating, may not be enough to reassure reluctant states,
especially the United States. Instead, any path to a rejuvenated WTO dispute
settlement system must include an approach to exceptions that
accommodates the domestic political bargains necessary to tackle
contemporary problems.

315. See Inception Impact Assessment, Carbon Border Tax Adjustment Mechanism (2020), supra
note 13.
316. The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future is “Made in All of America” by All of America’s
Workers, supra note 69.

